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ABSTRACT

Nigeria’s petroleum industry is the lynchpin of its economy. While oil has been
the source of immense wealth for the nation, that wealth has come at a cost. Nigeria’s main oilproducing region of the Niger River Delta has experienced tremendous environmental
degradation as a result of decades of oil exploration and production. Although there have been
numerous historical works on Nigeria’s oil industry, there have been no in-depth analyses of the
historical roots of environmental degradation over the full range of time from the colonial period
to the present. This thesis contends that the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s oil
producing region of the Niger Delta is the direct result of the persistent non-implementation of
regulatory policies by post-independence Nigerian governments working in collusion with oil
multinationals. Additionally, the environmental neglect of Nigeria’s primary oil-producing
region is directly traceable back to the time of colonial rule. Vital to this argument is the view
that the British colonial state created the economic institutions which promoted Nigerian
economic dependency after independence was achieved in 1960. The weakness of Nigeria’s
post-colonial dependent system is exposed presently through the continued neglect of regulatory
policies by successive post-colonial Nigerian governments.
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INTRODUCTION

Oil is the backbone of the Nigerian economy. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates
that 95% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings come from oil as well as 80% of the national
budgetary revenues.1 With proven reserves of over 37 billion dollars, Nigeria ranks tenth among
the largest oil producing nations in the world, and first overall among African nations. While
the precious commodity has produced untold wealth for the nation, it has also negatively
impacted social communities and has been the cause of devastation for the ecological landscape
of Nigeria’s primary oil-bearing region of the Niger River Delta. Nigeria was colonized by the
British who occupied the territory from 1900 until 1960 when Nigeria achieved political
independence. In the aftermath of political independence the future looked bright for the
Nigerian economy; however, that optimism would be short lived. For over half a century
Nigeria has experienced a level of environmental destruction, as a result of an unregulated oil
industry, that has left the Niger Delta’s ecology severely polluted and an indigenous population
in a perpetual state of social discontent. Since the mid-1960s, Nigeria has been beleaguered by
political instability, military coups, a civil war that lasted for three years, ethnic and sectarian
religious violence, and massive official corruption. Indeed, the hopes and aspirations of Nigeria
for self-sustaining growth have evaporated; Nigeria’s oil wealth has not translated into prosperity
for the majority of the population.
This thesis contends that the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s oil producing region
of the Niger Delta is the direct result of the persistent non-implementation of regulatory policies
by post-independence Nigerian governments working in collusion with oil multinationals.
1

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2012),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html#top (accessed May 25, 2012).
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Nigeria’s inability to regulate the oil industry is a product of its dependent relationship with the
oil companies. British colonial policies did not induce the transfer of technology. The system of
trade established during the colonial period was fundamentally unbalanced to favor the British
companies who dominated not only the export of trade goods, but also and more profoundly
important, controlled the technology needed to exploit Nigeria’s resources efficiently.
Accordingly, in order to explain Nigeria’s lack of meaningful development, scholars of
the twentieth century have employed the dependency theory. The dependency theory was
advanced in the 1960s by scholars attempting to find reasons for years of political instability,
social disequilibrium, and economic stagnation in Latin American counties. It developed out of
two historic traditions of economic thought: Marxism and Latin American structuralism. Latin
American structuralism is associated with the economic development scholars working with the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). However, the structuralist
works of the mid-twentieth century with their emphasis on internal economic structures, suffered
from a lack of detailed and rigorous analysis into the underdevelopment of Latin America.2 With
the proliferation of revolutionary movements across Latin America in the mid-twentieth century,
practitioners of the dependency school of thought, known as dependistas, utilized this theoretical
model to supplement former Marxian notions of class conflicts and capitalist expansion. The
American economic historian Andre Gunder Frank popularized the dependency theory with his
seminal work The Development of Underdevelopment published in the mid-1960s.
Indeed, the introduction of dependency theory offered scholars an alternate analytical
approach to the persistent underdevelopment experienced by Latin American countries, but more

2

Joseph L. Love, “The Origins of Dependency Analysis,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22, no. 1 (1990): 143168.; Also, Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in Development and Under-Development The
Political Economy of Global Inequality, ed. Mitchell A. Seligson and John Passe-Smith, 251-261 (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1998).
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significantly, it placed the theories of modernization and imperialism in a larger global context.3
This context was further broadened with the incorporation of large multinational corporations to
the debate about the underdevelopment of the so-called “Third World.” Scholars of the
dependency theory posit that multinationals, backed with massive bankrolls and the control over
technology, inhibited the growth of weaker economies by exploiting natural resources in a
manner which fostered unbalanced and dependent trade relationships in the global economic
system. Although dependency theory originated among scholars studying the problems
associated with the Latin American sub-region, by the late 1960s and early 1970s dependency
analysis began to be applied to the African continent by scholars such as Ann Seidman, Reginald
Green, and Samir Amin in an attempt to explain the multifarious economic problems of
underdeveloped African nations.4
This thesis applies a methodological approach framed by the dependency theory. It
utilizes the dependency theory to not only place Nigeria’s underdevelopment into broad
international context, but also to analyze Nigeria’s dependent relationship with the multinational
oil corporations as the root cause of the lack of enforcement of oil regulations throughout the late
colonial and post-colonial periods. While the dependency theory provides an applicable
framework for this thesis in a general sense, it is nevertheless weak when applied to the
examination of indigenous Nigerian resistance to colonial rule.
The dependency theory falls short in explaining individual agency within the context of
resistance to colonial and post-colonial authoritarian rule. This is best exemplified by the
indigenous protest movements against the colonial Richards Constitution during the late colonial

3

Louis A. Perez, Jr., “Dependency,” The Journal of American History 77, no.1 (1990): 133-142.
Green, Reginald Herbold, and Ann Willcox Seidman. Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.; also Amin, Samir. Imperialism and Unequal Development. New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1977.
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period as well as with the countless legal endeavors and non-violent resistance movements by
Niger Delta residents against environmental degradation. To fill this analytical gap, this thesis
borrows James Scott’s notion of the “weapons of the weak.” Scott describes this concept as the
“everyday forms of peasant resistance - the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry
and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.”5 Scott’s theory,
when applied to Nigeria’s situation, elicits an understanding of indigenous resistance to British
colonial rule, the post-colonial authoritarian Nigerian governments, and the harmful
environmental impacts of oil operations in the Niger Delta. While generally ineffectual
throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods in meaningfully effecting regulatory policies,
indigenous resistance has increased in significance during the twenty-first century as resistance
became more forceful and violent with the formation of the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND).
Further, Nigeria’s post-colonial state in addition to being dependent has maintained the
economic and political institutions that were created during the colonial period. As renowned
African historian Frederick Cooper states in his work Africa Since 1940, “New African
governments inherited both the narrow, export-oriented infrastructure which developmentalist
colonialism had not yet transcended and the limited markets for producers of raw material which
the post-war boom in the global economy only temporary improved.”6 In other words, the
governing bodies of post-independence Nigeria are the “gate-keepers” of Nigeria’s post-colonial
state, controlling all aspects of interactions between Nigeria and the global economy.
To be sure, the Nigerian economy at independence in 1960 was still based on producing
raw materials for foreign markets. Nigeria’s weak position in the world economy made the new
5

James C. Scott, “Peasant Weapons of the Weak,” in European Imperialism,1830-1930, ed. Alice L. Conklin and
Ian Christopher Fletcher, 184-189 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 185.
6
Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past and Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4.
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nation vulnerable to the interests of multinational corporations. With regard to Nigeria’s oil
industry, this thesis further argues that the post-colonial state has been more interested in
exploration and increased oil production than in creating regulatory policies for the oil
companies. Unlike the environmental policies of developed nations with regard to oil
operations, such as initial environmental impact studies and gas-reinjection acts, Nigeria has
failed to implement and enforce these regulatory policies. Environmental degradation has
destroyed the traditional economic systems of the Niger Delta which was based on fishing and
agricultural production. As a result, there has been not only a massive exodus from the rural
areas to the urban centers, but has also created an army of unemployed youths. Frederick Cooper
makes this point poignantly in his book Africa Since 1940 that colonial regimes in certain
regions in Africa implemented policies that impaired the “ecosystem” thereby diminishing the
economic opportunities available to the people and as a result “labor reserves” were created.7
Cooper’s model is applicable to the Niger Delta, which has witnessed over the past several years
the massive destruction of marine resources and arable agricultural land. It was not until 1988
that the Nigerian government established the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA).
While FEPA’s creation marks a supposed step forward for Nigerian environmental management
and policy, the lack of adequate monitoring systems has rendered the agency’s mission
effectively unfulfilled.8
Scope and Sources
This thesis covers a period of over one hundred years from c. 1900 when the British
colonized Nigeria to the present. Geographically, this work will concentrate on the oilproducing region of the Niger River Delta. Although colonization was not ultimately achieved

7
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by the British until the turn of the twentieth century, Europeans had established trade
relationships with the coastal people of southeastern Nigeria since the 15th century. In 1960,
Nigeria won its independence from the British, just four years after crude oil was first discovered
in commercial quantities. With no regulatory policies in place, the oil industry has been
responsible for the tremendous ecological damage caused to the main oil-bearing region of
Nigeria.
This thesis engages both primary and secondary source material to strengthen the central
argument of how Nigeria’s post-independence political establishment has allowed multinationals
to exploit oil resources in an unregulated manner causing severe consequences for the natural
environments of the Niger River Delta. Through the use of colonial documents, such as annual
reports and the personal memoirs of colonial officials, this thesis analyzes the colonial
institutions which established the conditions for Nigeria’s dependence on foreign technology.
Furthermore, Nigerian newspapers and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) reports from
independence in 1960 to the present are employed to illuminate how the oil industry, operating in
an unregulated fashion, has negatively impacted not only the natural environment but also the
indigenous population of the main oil-bearing region of the Niger Delta. Careful attention is
paid to the use of newspaper articles. As with all primary sources of a subjective nature, an
“against the grain” scrutiny is applied when analyzing this source. The same concern applies to
the examination of NGO reports as many of these agencies publish reports with blatant agendas.
Newspaper articles and NGO reports are extremely valuable to this study as a medium for
understanding the social and economic dimensions of environmental degradation. In addition to
its primary sources, this thesis utilizes secondary source materials concerning colonial,
environmental, economic and political histories of Nigeria. The authors of these works vary in

6

professional and academic disciplines ranging from economic historians and political scientists
to legal scholars and news journalists.

Historiography
Since oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria over a half century ago,
historical scholarship has discussed issues relating to the evolution of the oil industry and its
destructive impact on the environment. However to date there has been no in-depth study
focusing on environmental degradation over the full range of time from the colonial period to the
present. A general survey of the historiography of the oil industry in Nigeria reveals three main
phases of scholarly work that span approximately six decades. There is a palpable optimistic
view in the earliest scholarship on the oil industry, highlighting the positive fiscal potential of the
resource for the Nigerian economy. The early scholarship represents awareness for the
importance of the oil industry to Nigerians as well as an understanding of how essential it was to
maintain resource control. This trend is evident in the work of Scott Pearson who wrote on the
effects of the oil industry on the Nigerian economy as well as its attempt to regulate it. His
work, like other early scholarship, sets out to answer the important question, “[w]hat are the
recent and likely future impacts on the Nigerian economy of the flow of petroleum-related
investments in Nigeria?”9 A shift in the historiography occurs with the conclusion of the
Nigerian civil war in 1970. Nigerian oil historiography, from that point forward, focuses more
on how the oil industry has negatively impacted Nigerian society and less on its optimistic
future. Much of post-civil war scholarship concentrates on the oil shock, the impact of the boom
and bust on the Nigerian economy, and nationalization.

9

Scott R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970)
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Themes of oil, the economy, and nationalization continued to be present in the literature
throughout the 1990s; however, as academic scholarship shifted toward human rights violations
in the Niger Delta, so did academic focus move toward studies of environmental destruction.10
Indeed, the study of environmental degradation has only really gained scholarly attention in the
preceding two decades. Three noticeably diverse phases are apparent within this most recent
historiographical shift. First, there is a conspicuous concentration on human rights violations and
the environmental degradation of the Niger River Delta as exemplified by the works of Ken
Saro-Wiwa, Jedrzej Frynas, Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas.11 The second phase occurs after
the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP) activists in 1995. With these executions came copious amounts of literature
from journalists, NGOs, and documentarians, which contributed to the enlightenment of the
global community regarding the environmental and social impacts of the oil industry on the
Niger Delta Region. The last phase focuses on the Nigerian judicial system and its interaction
with the many oil multinationals operating in the Delta, especially Shell Petroleum Development
Company (SPDC).12
Published in 1990, the pioneering historical monograph of Augustine Ikein, The Impact
of Oil on a Developing Country, explores the relationship between oil operations and the pattern
of Nigeria’s national and regional development, and their implications for the oil producing areas
of the Niger Delta.13 Scholarship produced prior to Ikein’s important and seminal study,
concentrate mainly on the oil industry and the trends in production, markets, revenues, and
10

Genova and Falola, “Oil in Nigeria,” 133-156.
Ken Saro-Wiwa, Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy, (London, 1992); Jedrzej George Frynas, Oil in
Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000).
Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta, (San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2001)
12
Genova and Falola, “Oil in Nigeria,” 151-152.
13
Augustine A. Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country The Case of Nigeria, (New York: Praeger, 1990),
xxi.
11
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economic growth. Ikein’s work directs scholars and lay people alike to focus more attention on
not only the impact of the oil industry on the mineral producing areas but also on the welfare of
the indigenous populations in those areas. His work emphasizes a feature of the oil industry in
Nigeria that, until his study, had been greatly neglected in the historiography: the oil industry’s
impact on the environment and social community.
Sarah Khan’s influential work, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil studies the impact
of poor resource control and mismanagement of funds on Nigeria’s economy. Her work is
among the first to demonstrate the direct relationship between the political economy and
environmental issues. The correlation illuminated in her study provides essential context for
understanding how poorly regulated exploitation of resources can have detrimental effects on the
ecology of oil producing areas.14 In addition to Khan, historian Toyin Falola has also
contributed works dealing with similar issues of oil and the environment. Falola has produced an
abundant amount of research concerning Nigeria’s role in the global oil industry, the history of
oil in Nigeria, and West African development and decolonization.15
Another major theme presented in Nigerian oil and environmental historiography regards
development and social unrest. Daniel Omoweh, V.T. Jike, and Cyril Obi among other scholars
view the Delta’s ruined environmental condition as being crucial in shaping and restructuring
social dynamics in both rural and urban areas. Scholarship regarding development and social
disequilibrium is responsible for bringing Niger Delta rural underdevelopment from the
periphery of environmental studies to the center.16 Also, the shifting focus of scholars toward
14

Sarah Ahmad Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
ToyinFalola and Ann Genova. The Politics of the Global Oil Industry, (Westport: Praeger, 2005); ToyinFalola and
Matthew M. Heaton. A History of Nigeria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
16
Daniel A. Omoweh, Shell Petroleum Development Company, the State and Underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger
Delta: A study in Environmental Degradation, (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).; V.T. Jike, “Environmental
Degradation, Social Disequilibrium, and the Dilemma of Sustainable Development in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria,”
Journal of Black Studies 34 (2004): 686-710.; Cyril L. Obi, “Oil and the Minority Question,” in The National
15
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environmental issues in the early 1990s prompted in-depth ecological studies and human rights
issues by various Western media agencies and non-governmental organizations. Among the
most notable journalists and activists writing on the environment in the Niger Delta are Andrew
Rowell and Michael Peel, both of whom have numerous published works based on first-hand
accounts and personal experiences in the Delta Region.17
Although thorough, the historiography of environmental degradation in the oil producing
area of the Niger Delta has significant shortcomings. An overwhelming amount of the historical
literature on Niger Delta environmental degradation discusses the topic within the context of the
impact of official corruption, social and human rights concerns, and the issue of resource
control.18 The works of Frynas and Saro-Wiwa adequately address the fundamental issues
associated with the impact of environmental degradation on the Nigerian people, yet both authors
ignore analysis of the history of environmental degradation. The scholarship not only neglects to
examine the historical roots of environmental degradation, but it also fails to explain
environmental degradation in terms of British colonial policy which among other things
precluded the transfer of technology to the Nigerian colony. This policy resulted in Nigeria
becoming a subordinate partner in the expanding oil industry. A similar weakness is discernible
in the historical works related to Nigeria’s political economy and resource control in the oil
producing region. Although the works of Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, and
Falola, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry, focus on the impacts of official corruption on

Question in Nigeria Comparative Perspectives, ed. Abubakar and Said Adejumobi, 97-118 (Burlington: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2002)
17
Andrew Rowell, Green Backlash Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement, (London: Routledge,
1996).; Michael Peel. A Swamp Full of Dollars Pipelines and Paramilitaries at Nigeria’s Oil Frontier, (Chicago:
Lawrence Hill Books, 2009)
18
This is apparent with Daniel Omoweh’s SPDCThe State and Underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger Delta A Study
of Environmental Degradation, (Trenton: African World Press, Inc. 2005). While there are many examples of the
ways in which SPDC is polluting the Delta, the environment takes a backseat to analysis of Shell’s reckless oil
operations as well as notions of underdevelopment.
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Nigeria’s political system and its implications for development, their studies are limited only to
the post-colonial period. Furthermore, Khan’s study concentrates on the time period between the
oil boom of the 1970s through the early 1990s and Falola’s work discusses the global politics of
oil. While their research is thorough and relevant to their particular arguments, both authors
essentially approach environmental degradation as a current and compelling problem facing the
population, never pinpointing or addressing its historical origins.
Additionally, the issues of underdevelopment and environmental degradation,
exemplified by the works of Omoweh and Obi, similarly neglect in-depth analysis of its
historical origins in the oil producing region. For example, Omoweh’s work, although
distinguished by its title: A Study in Environmental Degradation, presents only a limited view of
the origins of Nigeria’s environmental situation. His work contends that the environmental
degradation of the Niger Delta began when Shell Petroleum Development Company first
initiated operations in 1937, yet he never adequately connects environmental destruction to the
non-implementation of oil regulations by successive Nigerian governments. This thesis goes
beyond the convention historiography of Nigeria’s oil industry by undertaking a comprehensive
examination of environmental degradation throughout the course of Nigeria’s late colonial and
post-colonial periods using three models, the dependency theory and Frederick Cooper’s notions
of the “gate-keeper” state and the creation of “labor reserves” as a deliberate policy in certain
parts of Africa.

Chapter Summary
This thesis is composed of three chapters divided into two main chronologically based
phases of Nigerian history. The first chapter discusses Nigeria’s colonial background. In

11

addition to establishing a geographical context, chapter one examines how economic relations
were dominated by the British colonial state which controlled all aspects of resource exploitation
and the export trade. This unbalanced trade relationship gave British companies an advantage
over Nigerian middleman traders and producers with regard to the terms of trade of cash crops
such as cocoa, peanuts, and oil palm products. Chapter one also details the earliest exploratory
activities for crude oil in the Niger Delta Region as well as historical background on the
formation of large oil multinationals which operate in the region today. Also, the earliest
beginnings of environmental degradation are identified as a result of the non-implementation of
regulatory policies. While the colonial era saw a number of legislative acts regarding the
burgeoning oil industry, the lack of enforcement of these regulations, with regard to
environmental management, had extremely negative impacts on the natural and social
environments of Nigeria’s Delta Region.
Chapter two builds on the preceding analysis to further explore the environmentally
degraded nature of Nigeria’s Niger Delta from political independence in 1960 to 1988 when
Nigeria established the first governmental agency with the specific goal of environmental
protection, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency. This chapter expands on the central
argument of this thesis that the political establishment of post-independence Nigeria allowed
multinational oil companies to operate in an unregulated manner. The political system that was
put in place by the British on the eve of political independence was deeply flawed. It was
characterized by the division of Nigeria into three official regions thus promoting regional
nationalism and ethnic rivalry. The tensions created by this system would eventually lead to the
intrusion of the military into Nigeria’s political life through a coup in 1965, and then a countercoup in 1966, and eventually a civil war from 1967-1970. During this turbulent political period

12

the federal government of Nigeria was more interested in oil exploration, production, and oil
revenues, than in instituting any regulatory policies. Ultimately, the Nigerian post-colonial state
was a predatory state that was centered on a system of patronage to political supporters who were
based in the different regions. For the most part, resources managed by the state were used by
politicians to promote their narrow interests at the expense of everyday Nigerian men and
women.
The third chapter concentrates on the time period from 1988 to the present. The failure to
enforce regulations regarding Nigeria’s oil industry has resulted in tremendous consequences for
the environment and social communities of the Niger Delta region. The destruction of the
“ecosystem” has in fact created a lack of viable economic opportunities and has resulted in the
creation of what Frederick Cooper has called “labor-reserves.” The diminution of economic
opportunities has resulted in the emergence a large number of unemployed youths who have
been a key component of uprisings in the most oil exploited areas. While the resistance
movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained the attention of NGOs as well as the global
community, their protest against the degradation of the environment has continually been
silenced by the Nigerian state. Additionally, as the economic and social consequences of
environmental degradation have intensified, the resistance movements have become more
aggressive and violent in nature. The strategies employed by these resistance groups include
sabotage of oil production facilities and pipelines and the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,”
on the black market to fund militant activity.

13

CHAPTER 1: THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND

This chapter describes the geography of the oil producing areas of the Niger River Delta.
It also analyzes the political and economic institutions created by the British administration
during the colonial era from 1900 to 1960. This chapter argues that the economic and political
policies instituted by the British led to a post-independence Nigerian economy deeply dependent
on the technological equipment and expertise of Britain and multinational oil companies. After
the conquest of Nigeria in the early 1900s, British economic policies were designed to facilitate
the exploitation of Nigeria’s raw materials. British colonial policies and institutions, exemplified
by the Colonial Minerals Ordinance of 1914, supported the monopolistic control of crude oil
exploration in the Niger Delta. Because of this, Nigeria as an independent nation would
transition from colonial rule deficient in the technology and appropriate skill sets to effectively
exploit its oil resources. This left Nigeria dependent on foreign economies and multinational oil
companies which possessed the equipment and technological capability to extract and produce
Nigeria’s oil resources. While regulations were passed regarding resource control during the
colonial period, the British created no safeguards against environmental damage.

14

Figure 1: Nigeria and West Africa1

Geographical Context
With regard to geographical context, it is vital for this particular study to describe the
environmental sensitivity of the various ecological systems found within the Niger Delta Region.
Nigeria’s Niger River Delta is one of the largest wetland regions in the world. Its massive
70,000 square kilometer area, roughly 27,000 square miles, is made up of fresh and salt water
swamps, tidal pools, beach ridges, and mangrove forests.2 The Niger and Benue Rivers both
drain into the Delta and approximately 75% of the area where these two immense rivers
converge is regularly inundated with water.3 The physical attributes of the Delta Region have
been shaped by the nature of the water flow and the type of soil that is deposited. A combination

1

Nigeria and West Africa Region, map, http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/NigerDelta_WestAfrica.html.
Ebiegberi Joe Alogoa, A History of the Niger Delta, (Port Harcourt: Doval Ventures Limited, 2005 (1972). 11-13.
3
Haller, Fossil Fuels, Oil Companies, and Indigenous Peoples, 57.
2
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of both these aspects affects the vegetation that grows in the area. Furthermore, the physical
features of the Delta Region are divided into three distinct sections, sandy beach ridges, salt
water swamps, and fresh water swamps.

Figure 2: Nigeria’s Niger Delta- Rivers, States, and Vegetation 4

The beach ridges consist of many small islands stretching along the coast which vary in
size from a hundred feet to ten miles in width. Barrier islands are the youngest portion of the
Delta and are formed from the coastal currents moving sand along the Niger River distributaries.
Further inland from the coast, the salt water belt, which is approximately 20 to 25 miles wide, is
the next distinctive physical feature of the Delta. This belt is composed of black silt and is

4

Niger Delta: Rivers, States, Vegetation, map, Urhobo Historical Society, 1999-2012,
http://www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Maps/NigerDelta_Rivers.html (accessed August 7, 2012).
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flooded daily with up to two feet of water during high tide. Distinct to this section is the red
mangrove, which appropriately explains the regions nickname, the mangrove forest belt. The
last section is the fresh-water swamp. This area is covered with reddish brown soil that joins
with the older soil of the mainland Nigeria.
The fresh-water swamp’s elevation is relatively high above the water level, yet the region
still floods two months out of the calendar year. The fresh-water swamp section is where the
population density is the highest, and farming and other agricultural practices prevails over
fishing as the main dietary source among local groups.5 The environment of this area is
extremely sensitive and relies on consistency and regularity to maintain environmental balance.
The geography and the predictability of environmental conditions are central to sustaining the
way of life of the different ethnic groups living in the Delta. In many cases it is the geographical
differences that have historically defined the cultural traits as well as movements and interactions
of the Delta people. This ecological system came under significant attack with the introduction
of oil exploration by small British owned companies to the Niger Delta in 1903. By 1956 crude
oil was discovered for the first time in commercial quantities. This discovery drew many more
oil companies to the Niger Delta, and as a result the region has experienced tremendous
ecological damage.

British Colonialism
The British abolished the slave trade in 1807, and slavery in its colonial territories in
1833. With the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the British sought new economic
opportunities. Britain was the first European nation to industrialize. Soon, industrialization
spread to other nations in Europe which led to increased competition for new sources of raw
5

Alogoa, A History of the Niger Delta, 13.
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materials as well as new markets in the world system. As a way to organize the process,
Europeans met in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. The final official document of the
conference, the Berlin Act, established the principle of effective occupation. This would lead to
the scramble and partition of Africa by European powers. In order to secure trade opportunities
along the West African coast, the British in 1885, declared a protectorate over the Niger Delta.
British expansion and economic interests in Nigeria were “morally justified” as an
obligation; in Alice Conklin’s words, to “uplift the barbaric native peoples living outside the
West.”6 This justification became known as “the white man’s burden.” The moral justification
of “the white man’s burden” directly affected the policy decisions in the British colonial
territories which included the creation of schools and public services. This concept states that
the less “culturally developed” peoples needed the rule of Western colonizers to lift them from
“barbarism” until they can function on their own in the global community both economically and
socially. Rudyard Kipling popularized the term in his 1899 poem, “The White Man’s Burden,”
which was originally written to describe America’s conquest of the Philippine Islands. Kipling’s
work became a metaphor for the arrogant and racist view that Western cultural superiority could
lift Africans out of ignorance and poverty. Kipling’s views are reflected in the following excerpt
from his poem:
Take up the White Man’s BurdenThe savage wars of peaceFill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when you goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all you hope to nought.7
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With the Niger Delta under British control, the next step was to secure interests in areas
which could be reached by navigating the Niger River system, essentially controlling the trade
along the Niger River. In an effort to succeed in that objective, the British granted a royal
charter to George Goldie’s National African Company, later changed to the Royal Niger
Company (RNC). The RNC set up legal treaties with local traders along trading routes of the
Niger and Benue Rivers. While the treaty zones that were set up helped introduce British
administrative influence further inland, that objective was ancillary to the primary goal of
monopolizing the trade along Nigeria’s navigable rivers. Furthermore, the trade monopoly
essentially accomplished Britain’s aim of keeping France and Germany from gaining position in
the lucrative trade. The mission was a success and less than a decade later, the British declared
the southern portion of Nigeria as the Niger Coast Protectorate; ultimately by 1900, the whole of
Nigeria was under British control and the Northern and Southern Protectorates were established
accordingly.8
In 1914, the British colonial government amalgamated the Northern and Southern
protectorates of Nigeria, which in effect created the colony of Nigeria and established its
political borders. With amalgamation the prior two administrations were replaced by a single
governmental entity, under the rule of the first governor-general of the unified Nigeria, Sir
Frederick Lugard. According to Lugard, “the scheme of amalgamation adopted in Nigeria was
designed to involve as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible, while providing for the
introduction later of such further changes as were either foreseen, but not immediately necessary,
or might be suggested by future experience.”9 In addition, a new Executive Council, which was
composed of senior officials from the whole of the Nigerian territory, took the place of the prior
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established Restricted Council. The Executive Council was made up of both European and
native community members and was chiefly concerned with issues of shipping, banking,
commercial, and mining interests. According to the governor general, “[t]he Executive Council
[was] an institution of the utmost importance. It afford[ed] the Governor an invaluable
opportunity of inviting the criticism and suggestions of the ablest and most experienced of his
staff, not individually but collectively, when the views of one [were] opposed or confirmed by
another, weak points [were] detected and new aspects brought to light.”10 At the time of the
amalgamation the new Council’s actions were restricted to the overall review of current events
while at the same time maintaining awareness of public opinion in regard to changing
developments of governmental policy.
The new colonial political structure of Nigeria was divided into two separate spheres,
which loosely traced the borders of the previous territories of Northern and Southern Nigeria.
These new spheres were titled the Northern and Southern Provinces and were each headed by a
Lieutenant-Governor. Individual Lieutenant-Governors were assisted by a separate Secretariat,
both of whom reported to the Governor-General. The Northern Province, which spanned an area
of 255,700 square miles and had a population of approximately nine and a quarter million
people, was headed by Lieutenant-Governor Temple C.M.G., who previously held the position
of Chief Secretary of Northern Nigeria. The new Southern Province, which stretched across a
more modest area of 78,600 square miles and had a population of approximately seven and three
quarter million people, was headed by Lieutenant-Governor Boyle C.M.G., who previously held
the rank of Colonial Secretary of Southern Nigeria. This new unified system was initially
constructed to subvert the difficulty associated with applying different sets of laws to each
separate sphere. This was a necessary step because of the religious and cultural differences of
10

Ibid, 121.

20

the indigenous populations of the North and South. It has been recorded in the 1914 annual
report by Lugard that “[t]he system of land tenure and the prerogative of the Crown in respect to
lands, the system of taxation, of the Courts of Law, and the methods of Native Administrations
were fundamentally different; and the adoption of any other method of sub-division, such as had
been suggested, would therefore have produced initial chaos.”11
As referenced earlier, the main goal of Governor-General Lugard was to centralize the
administrative apparatus with as little dislocation as possible. While amalgamation physically
combined the different regions of Nigeria into one unified territory, the regions were often
governed differently utilizing a concept of “divide and rule”. The North and South were
fundamentally different and Lugard recognized that the previous administration in southern
Nigeria, as opposed to that in the North, lent too much power and influence to colonial officers
with reference to indigenous courts and councils. In an attempt to remedy the situation, Lugard
further exercised the colonial model of “divide and rule.” He established a system of direct
taxation on the southern indigenous population which he believed sustained the power held by
traditional chiefs and kings in Nigeria, although the presence of British colonial officials
continued to be outwardly apparent. While many reports detailed the impracticality of applying
a direct taxation system similar to the one established in the North, to the South of Nigeria, Lord
Lugard went ahead with his decision and essentially transformed the political and economic
system of the Southern Nigerian Province.12
With the creation of a workable political system, the British put into place an economic
system that was designed to facilitate the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources. To this end,
between 1900-1930, the British colonial administration in Nigeria created a transport network of
11
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railroads, roads, and harbors that opened up the interior of the country to British companies. The
colonial administration began construction of a railroad in Lagos in 1896. By 1924, the railroad
had connected important areas of raw materials such as the cocoa-growing areas of Ibadan, the
oil-producing areas of the Southeastern region, the tin mines of the Middle Belt Region, and then
centers of peanut production in Northern Nigeria. As a complement to the railroad system, the
government built roads that were intended to open up more distant areas of cash crop production.
The government had created approximately 20,000 miles of road in the raw material-rich areas
of Nigeria by the 1940s. Additionally, ports and harbors were built in key areas such as Lagos
and Port Harcourt for exporting raw materials.
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The creation of a transport network had two important consequences. First, it resulted in
a significant growth of agricultural and mineral production. Second, it led to an influx of
European trading companies into the interior of Nigeria. By the 1950s, Nigeria had become the
leading producer of oil palm products in the world and the second leading producer of both
peanuts and cocoa. Although Nigeria’s colonial economy was based predominantly on
agriculture, the mineral resources of Nigeria were also a vital source of revenue. The extractive
industries during the colonial period, such as tin and later crude oil were completely controlled
by European companies. These companies did not contribute to industrial education nor did they
transfer technology to the Nigerian colony. During the early colonial period the British
government claimed ownership of Nigeria’s mineral resources. They took over these rights after
the Royal Niger Company was stripped of its charter. Subsequently, European companies were
granted long term leases to extract Nigeria’s resources. For example, the Minerals Oil Ordinance
No. 17 of 1914 reinforced Britain’s monopoly over oil exploration within the borders of their
territory. Because of the supremacy of the colonial state, all British legislative acts trumped the
local customs and conventions of the pre-colonial Chiefdoms, communities, and principalities.14
Consistent with British legislative supremacy, the Minerals Oil Ordinance took precedence over
all pre-colonial orders and was a vital factor in the evolution of the crude oil industry in Nigeria.
In addition to the Act affirming control over all Nigeria’s mineral resources, it also prohibited
any non-British company from conducting oil operations within the territory.

Multinational Oil Companies in the Delta
Initial exploratory activities for crude oil began in Nigeria in 1903 by small, British
owned oil companies. During the early years, little attention was given to Nigeria as a destination
14
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for exploration because the British government’s oil investments were mostly concentrated in
Eastern Europe and the Americas where there were already vast quantities of proven reserves.
When British owned companies began exploring for oil in Nigeria, the global supply of crude oil
far outweighed the demand. However, the market began to shift as technological innovations
such as the internal combustion engine facilitated the expansion of the automobile industry.
Consequently, the market for crude oil expanded outside of its traditional use as an illuminating
oil and lubricant and by 1914 petroleum and fuel oil surpassed kerosene with nearly 64 percent
of all refined crude oil products.15 This figure rose steadily over the following years as the
popularity of motor vehicles, oil burning locomotives and naval and merchant vessels increased.
Early in the twentieth century minor attempts at oil exploration were conducted by
companies such as Nigeria Properties, the Nigeria and West African Development Syndicate,
and the Northern Nigeria Exploration Syndicate; however, little initial success was recorded
from these businesses.16 This trend changed when the first serious exploratory undertaking in
Nigeria was coordinated by John Simon Bergheim and the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation.
Simon Bergheim gained valuable experience during his stint in the oil producing regions of
Galicia and Romania. From that experience he eventually became co-founder and co-owner of
the Galizisch Karpathen-Petroleum Actiengesellschaft. The Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a
small British-registered company, was founded in November 1905 with the key objective of
obtaining exploratory rights within the Nigerian territory.17 In 1906, Bergheim secured a
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significant loan from the British Admiralty and the colonial office for oil exploration in the
southern region of Nigeria. The concessionary area in which the Nigerian Bitumen
Corporation’s operations expanded was in the surrounding area of the Lekki Lagoon, located in
the south of Nigeria and adjacent to the operations of the Northern Nigeria Syndicate.18
With funding from the British Admiralty and the colonial office, the Nigerian Bitumen
Corporation commenced operations in 1906, under the managing supervision of Frank Drader.
Like Bergheim, Drader gained considerable oil experience from working in active fields in
Galicia as well as Canada. From the onset, the exploratory operations had a negative impact on
the natural environment of the Lekki Lagoon area; crude oil exploration brought with it major
disturbances to the local ecology. Immense tracts of land were cleared to create space for
dwellings to be constructed for workers. Also, large areas of land were leveled to make room for
drill sites as well as for transportation infrastructure such as roads and tramways. The
development of infrastructure in regions in which the oil companies were operating, however,
was geared toward a more efficient way to export rather than to enhance the living conditions of
the local population. In addition to the environmental destruction caused by land clearing
techniques, there was an untold amount of pollution to the waterways from oil spillage.19 In a
letter to his wife in 1909, Nigerian Bitumen’s field manager Frank Drader explained the
environmental consequence of a recent oil discovery from No. 5 Well located in Lekki Lagoon,
which when initially tapped, flowed at a rate of 2,000 barrels a day. Drader stated that “[t]he
lagoon is at present all covered with oil… and there was so much oil at our wharf here that the
Doctor got all covered last night when he went swimming, which he does every evening.”20
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The Nigerian Bitumen Corporation had some successful discoveries, such as well No. 12
yielding a fair amount of good quality oil with no gas; however, by 1914 the company was
ultimately dissolved due to compounded financial troubles and other unforeseen events.21 While
other companies were present in the region, they had even less overall success than the Nigerian
Bitumen Corporation. This lack of success revealed much about not only the surroundings in
which those companies were working, but also it shed light on the early conditions established
that promoted Nigeria’s dependence on foreign companies during the late colonial period. First,
because of the tough nature of exploration operations in the dense mangrove forests and unstable
swamp marshes, expensive equipment and skilled personnel were required for the success and
early sustainability of oil companies operating in Nigeria.22 Second, the companies that first
started exploring for oil were small and privately owned. Because these businesses were
unsuccessful it could be implied that the use of large oil companies, backed with huge financial
resources and technological capacity, was essential to conduct oil operations in the challenging
Nigerian environment.23 Oil exploration in Nigeria proved to be an arena only suitable for
companies with huge financial backing and technological capability that were based on joint
agreements where resources could be pooled. Early sustainability was also supported by British
legislative acts that encouraged monopolistic control of resources.
The Minerals Oil Ordinance of 1914, which was amended in 1925, 1950 and 1958, set
the ground work for the British government and its main oil partners to control all aspects of oil
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exploration in Nigeria. The British government granted oil licenses to the British based
companies, D’Arcy Exploration Company and the Whitehall Petroleum Corporation to explore
within the territory. By 1923, however, both companies surrendered their licenses because little
or no commercial amount of oil was discovered.24 More than a decade later in 1936, British
Petroleum fused interests with Royal Dutch/Shell group and became the Shell D’Arcy Oil
Company. This merger was one that initially took root years earlier when the two companies
operated together in the Persian Gulf under the same joint-venture designation, Shell D’Arcy.25
By 1937 a license had been issued to the joint-venture which awarded the two joined companies
exclusive exploration rights across the whole of the Nigerian territory.26 Omeje states that, “the
exclusive oil exploration authority was granted to protect the economic interests of Shell and the
British Empire against other foreign competitors, notably American oil multinationals that were
obviously interested in the Nigerian market.” 27
Shell D’Arcy began preliminary geological and geophysical surveys in 1937 in the area
of the Niger River Delta. The results from the surveys determined that 103,600 square
kilometers in southern Nigeria were oil bearing and concentrated exploration commenced.
Operations were put on hold in 1939 as a result of the outbreak of World War II and did not
resume again until a year after the conclusion of the War. Furthermore, because of the War more
import emphasis was placed on nations with already developed oil industries. Because of a
notice from Oil Controller, D.C. Fletcher Nigeria was forced to ration petroleum use within the
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territory, stating that “the reduction in supplies to Nigeria will therefore involve a reduction in
petrol resources.” An article from 1944 states, “This [was] essentially a mechanised war in
which on land, on the sea, and in the air fuel is of vital importance.” The article went on to claim
that “without that fuel [result of 20% ration] the invasions would fail and Hitler would
triumph.”28 Oil exploration by Shell D’Arcy resumed in Nigeria again after the conclusion of the
War; however, the economic impact from the war was felt by the colonial power and with that
came a tightening of control over the oil industry by the British.
In 1948, the joint venture, Shell D’Arcy, was forced to restructure the composition of
their internal directorate so as to satisfy the requirements of the British control clause of the
Minerals Oil Ordinance. A clause in the Minerals Oil Ordinance declared that non-British
companies could not operate in the Nigerian territory. The company’s directorate, which at the
time of the restructuring had a majority Dutch membership, was required by the British colonial
administration to reorganize if they wanted to continue to maintain their privileged exploratory
status in Nigeria.29
The Minerals Oil Ordinance continued to support the British monopoly over oil
exploration as Shell/D’Arcy began drilling its first deep exploration well in 1951. Unfortunately
for the company, no oil was found in the prospectively prosperous 1951 Ihue well, which was
located at sixteen kilometers northeast of Owerri in the present-day Imo State. In the five years
following, the company drilled eighteen wells of various functionalities in many different areas
in Southeastern Nigeria. The joint-venture discovered oil at the Akata-1 well in 1953; however,
it was not in commercial quantities and drilling focus shifted again. After three years of
searching in the Oloibiri area, oil was found for the first time in commercial quantities at the well
28
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two kilometers south of Otuabagi, in present day Bayelsa State, in 1956.30 This well measured a
depth of approximately 12,000 feet and produced a volume of 3,000 barrels of oil per day.
Because of the success of this well, a further eleven wells were drilled in the surrounding area.31
In addition to expanding operations, success also prompted the joint-venture company Shell
D’Arcy Exploration Company to change its name to Shell-BP Petroleum Development
Company.
After the successful discovery and drilling for oil in the Oloibiri wells, Shell-BP
concentrated their efforts on developing only the most lucrative wells covering an approximate
area of 100,000 square kilometers. Shell-BP’s monopoly over all the oil resources ended in
1957. As a result, the remainder of the territory was opened up to other international oil
corporations such as Mobil, Gulf, and Arnoseas, among many others.32 This internationalization
resulted in Nigeria gaining the status of an oil-producing country. According to Omoweh, “this
intensified the pressure of European/American oil companies on the colonial state to gain entry
in the Nigerian oil industry.”33 With the expansion of the oil industry in the Delta region,
significant environmental damage and social distress ensued.
Soon following the discovery of crude oil in 1956 and with the rapidly expanding oil
industry in Nigeria, another piece of legislation was enacted by the colonial state which would
consequently lead to significant impact on both the natural and social environments of the Niger
Delta. The Oil Pipeline Act of 1956 stated that oil companies operating in Nigeria needed to
obtain a legal permit to lay pipelines from the oil wells of the Niger Delta to their respective
terminals where it is prepared for exportation. Under the Act the state granted oil companies a
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land lease agreement good for 99 years. The lease prohibited any social and economic activity
within 500 meters on either side of the oil company’s pipelines. The length of time and
stipulations significantly impacted the natural and social environments of Nigeria’s oil producing
region for multiple reasons. First, the length of time was so great that oil companies viewed the
leased land as their own which therefore prompted little regulatory oversight from outside
entities. The Oil Pipeline Act concentrated heavily on the efficient transport of oil so little or no
requirements was added for the protection of the environment. This led to pipelines lying bare
and unmaintained above ground across residential communities located along main oil producing
transport routes. Also, because the Act stipulated distance requirements, local inhabitants were
essentially forced to relocate or risk breaking the law established by the colonial administration.
The initial reason for the Oil Pipeline Act was to boost revenue for the colonial state but
similar to other colonial legislative decrees, successive Nigerian governments left the act in place
in the post-colonial period. Even though the 1956 Act included language that suggested a
concern for the environmental consequences from oil exploration and production, revenue
accruement took precedence over the implementation of environmental safeguards. This was
amplified after 1960 when the independent Nigerian government lacked the appropriate
knowledge and technical capabilities of enforcing safety regulations that would monitor pipeline
construction and maintenance by the oil companies. A writer for The Nigerian Citizen noted that
the “lack of trained men is the problem.”34 This lack of technical skill and enforcement ability
gave “Shell [and other companies] the leeway to lay its pipelines across sacred sites and homes
of the people who live in the Niger Delta.”35 The Oil Pipeline Act of 1958 was amended in 1963
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during the early years of political independence. With the amendment to the Act came a
reduction of the amount of time the land leases were awarded to the oil companies. The initial
lease period was reduced from 99 years to 60 years; however, the amendment to the Act did not
lead to any significant changes. Since revenue obtained from the land lease contracts was
immensely lucrative for key members of the political establishment in Nigeria’s post-colonial
state, even amendments to colonial legislation did little to change already established standard
operating procedures. The successive post-colonial Nigerian governments working in
collaboration with oil multinationals would essentially pick up where the colonial administration
left off.
From the preceding presentation a number of conclusions can be made. The imposition
of colonial rule and the policy of “divide and rule” in Nigeria from 1900-1960 not only created
an uneven balance of power that favored the British colonial state, but it also ensured that
regional diversity and ethnic differences were sustained throughout the colonial period. The
establishment of the colonial administration facilitated the creation of an economic system that
allowed British companies, and then European and American companies, to dominate Nigeria’s
burgeoning oil industry. For example the Minerals Oil Ordinance encouraged oil exploration
and production by large oil joint-ventures. These large oil joint-ventures had a monopoly of the
technology and the technical expertise to completely dominate every facet of the oil industry
during the colonial period. The colonial state did not put in place regulatory policies. As a result
the multinational oil corporations operated in a regulatory vacuum which has resulted in
unbridled environmental destruction. The relationship between the colonial state and the

to prevent oil companies from willingly encroaching on other parts of land as well as to promote operations with as
little environmental impacts as possible. Providing this explanation highlights the faults in the Nigerian system in
the years following independence.
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multinational companies would foreshadow the economic, political, and legal structures of
Nigeria’s post -colonial governments.
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CHAPTER 2: NIGERIA’S POST-COLONIAL POLITICS AND THE
EXPANSION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, 1960-1988

Chapter two analyzes the environmental degradation of Nigeria’s Niger Delta from
political independence in 1960 to 1988 when Nigeria established the first governmental agency
with the specific goal of environmental protection. During this timeframe, Nigerian politics
went through incredible changes, first from 1965 to 1979, and then again from 1979 to 1986.
This chapter argues that the Nigerian government put into place policies that facilitated oil
exploration, drilling, and production, at the expense of regulatory policies. Furthermore, the
Nigerian government sought to control a larger share of the revenues from the production of oil.
In other words, the successive governments were more interested in oil revenues than they were
in establishing safeguards against the impacts of oil operations. Moreover, Nigeria’s political
landscape was beleaguered by ethnic politics, the lack of political will to institute regulatory
reform in the oil industry, and the intrusion of the military into Nigerian political life.
Additionally, decades of British colonialism had rendered the manufacturing and extractive
industries reliant on European technology and knowledge. At the time of independence,
Nigeria’s economy was still heavily dependent on agricultural exports; however, by the early
1970s oil had replaced agricultural exports as Nigeria’s chief foreign exchange earner.
Important changes in Nigerian politics began to take place during the mid-1960s when oil
production increased and quickly raised Nigeria to become the wealthiest nation in Africa. With
the appeal of quick money, successive governments in Nigeria promoted the speedy expansion of
the oil industry in a regulatory void. Besides, the Nigerian government lacked the monitoring
mechanisms to effectively oversee the oil industry with concerns relating to environmental
33

protection. In short, in the aftermath of political independence, the multinational oil corporations
operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta were essentially left to police themselves.
Nigeria achieved political independence on October 1, 1960; however, with
independence many challenges faced the new government. Foremost among the challenges
facing the new nation was the British colonial legacy. Decades of British colonialism in Nigeria
left an economic structure in place that was geared to favor the growth of foreign multinationals
as well as Britain itself; in addition the colonial policy of “divide and rule,” engendered a
political system that was profoundly broken. According to Frederick Cooper, Africa’s postcolonial states were “gate-keeper” states. Rather than focusing on the dichotomy between the
colonial and post-colonial state, Cooper bridges the gap between the two by highlighting the
continuities within both periods. For Cooper, the post-colonial state was a logical extension of
the colonial state because the structures and institutions that African leaders inherited were
maintained and sustained after independence was achieved. The example of Nigeria’s oil
industry confirms Cooper’s thesis. To be sure, Nigeria’s post-colonial state was weak, and
although rich in raw materials it lacked the technological capacity to exploit those resources on
its own terms. Moreover, Nigeria’s economy at the time of political independence was still
export oriented.
While the successive Nigerian governments implemented policies such as indigenization
and import substitution as a way to obtain greater control over the exploitation of its resources,
those schemes only marginally affected the control of the oil industry by multinational
corporations. This has been compounded by the emergence of what Fredrick Cooper calls
“clientelism,” in other words, the diversion of state resources to political ends.1 The Nigerian
state collaborated with the oil joint-ventures which intensified not only official corruption, but
1
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also the negative effects of “clientelism” for the Nigerian people. This chapter describes briefly
Nigeria’s political system from independence to 1979 in order to identify the fault lines in the
system. Additionally, this chapter demonstrates that although Nigeria’s political changes from
1965-1979 did not adversely affect Nigeria’s oil production, with exception of the Civil War
period of 1967-1970; it did create the conditions for the mismanagement of Nigeria’s oil wealth.

Road to Political Independence
The time period from 1947 to 1960 marked a time of great change for Nigeria’s colonial
system. Upon the conclusion of World War II, young educated Nigerians formed numerous
groups and organizations aimed at achieving their ultimate goal of self-government. The various
youth organizations coalesced to form the Nigerian National Council, which soon incorporated
members from the Cameroonian associations in Lagos, and the movement was renamed the
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). In addition to the main objective of
self-governance, the NCNC also promoted the unification of the Nigerian people across ethnic
lines. In less than a year after the formation of the NCNC, Governor Richards of the British
colonial administration presented a series of proposed amendments to Nigeria’s former 1923
Constitution. The new Richards Constitution, as it was referred to, was viewed as significantly
flawed by many Nigerians because it did little to implement the much anticipated post-war
reforms.2 The NCNC took the lead role in protesting this new Constitution by exercising various
forms of resistance available to them. In addition to rumors of assassination plots and the
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banning of several key Nigerian newspapers, the NCNC toured the colonial territory and raised
money to send a delegation to England to protest against the 1946 Constitution.3
When the delegation left for London in June 1947, Nigerians were in a heightened state
of discontent. Some members of the NCNC became increasingly militant. They organized
public lectures, formed protest rallies, and incited resistance movements by workers against the
British colonial regime. Resistance to the Constitution prompted a cycle of events where the
British colonial police responded to protests violently which further led to more protests and
rallies. In 1948, as a way to appeal to the unrest and frustration of the Nigerian people the
British colonial administration significantly revised the Richards Constitution. The revised
Richards Constitution reinforced the initial objective of the NCNC by promoting pan-Nigerian
unity through resistance; however, it also exacerbated regional loyalties by creating separate and
individual assembly houses in each of the three existing Nigerian regions. Regional separation
was met with mixed feelings by the Nigerian people. The newly reformed political system made
it apparent to the population that a single unitary governmental structure was unlikely to
maintain stability in Nigeria’s three diverse geographical, economic, and cultural regions for
long.
As a response to the grievances presented by the Nigerian people about the weaknesses in
the Richards Constitution, the new colonial governor John Macpherson held a Constitutional
Conference in Ibadan in 1950 which included the participation of Nigerian nationalist leaders. In
1951 the Macpherson Constitution was passed, significantly altering the previous political
framework. The Macpherson Constitution was an improvement of the Richards Constitution in
many ways such as granting greater legislative and economic power to the regional assemblies as
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well as generating the first general elections; however, with the advent of those changes, regional
lines grew more polarized. Ethnic loyalties galvanized during the general election where a
Yoruba-dominated Western Region, an Igbo-dominated Eastern region, and a Hausa/Fulanidominated Northern Region separated accordingly into political parties and campaigned for
control over the various regional assemblies.4
Political parties in the Eastern and Western Regions pushed the political agenda of
internal self-governance while the Northern Region opposed the scheme claiming the Nigerian
territory was not ready for it. At the center of the debate was the issue of governmental
centralization. Two constitutional conferences were held between July 1953 and February 1954
which included representatives from all regions to settle deliberations over this central issue. As
a result the Lyttleton Constitution was enacted in 1954. The Lyttleton Constitution established
Nigeria as a federation, consisting of the existing three regional distinctions, and the central
administration was created in the newly formed Federal Territory of Lagos. With the new
Constitution, each region was afforded the option of becoming fully self-governed; however, no
region immediately did so, and the British colonial administration remained in control.
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Figure 4: Regional Divisions5

The Lyttleton Constitution appealed to both the supporters of a strong central government
and those in favor of regional autonomy. By 1957, the regions of the West and East opted for
self-government and the Northern region claimed self-governance in 1959. Regional selfgovernment cemented ethnic dominance in each region, Hausa/Fulani in the North, Yoruba in
the West, and Igbo in the East; consequently, the ethnic minority groups feared a lack of
representation in their respective regions. This led to further debates, and further ethnic
divergence. In addition to minority concerns, the fear of southern domination by Northern
politicians proliferated across much of the Eastern and Western portions of the territory. In an
effort to calm fears, provisions were established within the new political framework which
barred Northern radical groups from taking over governmental power. Nigerian leaders and the
British set October 1, 1960 as the date for Nigerian independence. Upon political independence
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the newly sovereign nation was still deeply fractured along regional and ethnic lines. This would
prove extremely consequential for the development of a national identity.6

Figure 5: Nigeria's Main Ethnic Groups7

The First Republic
Both the 1960 and the 1963 constitutions of the newly independent Nigeria were framed
by the British parliamentary system. Under the new governing structure, Nigeria’s First
Republic attempted national programs to promote social and economic development. Among the
key issues on the agenda were more governmental control over national resources, better and
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more efficient infrastructure to aid Nigeria’s production economy, and a rapid revamping of
educational and health services. While the goals set by the new government were ambitious, and
some success was noted, the shortcomings far outweighed the achievements. Issues of colonial
legacy, national unity, and economic underdevelopment all plagued the national agenda of the
First Republic. Paramount in affecting these issues was the burgeoning development of
Nigeria’s oil industry and the significance of that industry in the global economic system.
During the first half of the 1960s Nigeria experienced a liberalization of oil investments that
essentially opened Nigeria up to a more diverse collection of foreign investors. Oil production
during the span of time from 1958-1966 grew from 5,100 barrels per day to over 417,000 barrels
per day respectively.8
As a result of Nigeria’s post-colonial reliance on the technology owned by oil companies,
the state developed a system of revenue collection which concentrated on the collection of land
rents from oil companies operating in the area. Because Nigeria had vast oil reserves and
virtually no pollution regulations guiding the oil industry, especially when held in comparison to
the oil regulations of developed nations, foreign oil companies were attracted to the region. Prior
to the start of any oil operation in developed nations throughout the world, a careful and
thorough environmental impact study was required to assess the potential negative effects oil
operations will have on the surrounding ecological area.9 The lack of environmental safeguards
enticed multinationals to Nigeria’s oil-producing area. This produced larger revenues for the
Nigerian government and large oil companies. Besides, there companies avoided any
responsibility for putting in place regulatory measures. Additionally, because revenue was
collected from land rents, this system provided little impetus for the Nigerian government to
8
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concentrate on the development of a nationalized oil industry in the immediate aftermath of
independence.
The First Republic recorded some achievements during the early years of political
independence. First, independence afforded everyday Nigerians the opportunity to actively
participate in governmental decisions for the first time. Under the First Republic, there was a
revival of African cultural arts, more access to public information through radio, newspapers,
and book publishing, and an expansion of educational institutions. However, these marginal
accomplishments by the First Republic were far outweighed by its failure to transform Nigeria’s
economy from its dependence on export revenue. During the governing of the First Republic
there were widespread unemployment, declining food production, and signs of popular uprising
throughout the nation. In addition, the problems of national identity were never fully settled
prior to attaining independence. Political power struggles between regional groups were
intensified as the economic importance of Nigeria’s developing oil industry on the global market
increased and as the different regions vied for control of a greater share of oil revenues. Political
parties were formed along ethnic lines which prevented the rise of a general sense of Nigerian
nationalism. Nigerian political culture would be characterized by political patronage at the
regional level at the expense of national unity. Consequently, a system of, what Frederick
Cooper calls “clientelism” developed in the regions and has pervaded every aspect of Nigerian
political life.10
The most severe cases of corruption at the time were occurring in the Western region of
Nigeria because of the large revenue increases as a result of the prospering cocoa industry. A
small group of political leaders were using their elite status to extract large sums of money from
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cocoa revenue to benefit their personal financial situations.11 Corruption took root regionally
and eventually spread upwards to the federal level.12 Throughout the period of the First
Republic, Ayittey states that, “government contracts, purchases, and loan programs were
systematically manipulated to enrich political officials and the politically well connected.”13
With rumors of corruption proliferating across the nation, the collective population began to
question whether the newly established federal system was adequate.14 These years were
intended to be a time of great wealth and advancement for Nigeria, a “period when the objectives
of political independence were supposed to be idealized and set into motion by the Nigerian
leadership.”15 Instead, the years following independence were marked by political instability and
stagnation that resulted in “a three-year crisis which drained the political, military, economic and
human resources of the young nation.”16

The Nigerian Civil War
Newly obtained Nigerian independence was delicate, and soon after the nation united,
ethnic lines again began to polarize. While political corruption and ethnic rivalry produced by
the colonial legacy engendered the conditions for the eventual overthrow of the civilian-run First
Republic, the immediate causes of the war were the result of certain key incidences that began
with the contested results of the census of 1962 and ended in civil war. When the census was
conducted in 1962, Nigeria had three prominent political parties: the National Council of
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the North, and
11
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the Action Group (AG) in the West. The NCNC and the AG both hoped that the results from the
1962 census would alter the representational ratio of the regions in their favor. The figures were
thought to have been tampered with because the numbers revealed that each regions’ population
had grown by nearly 75%. The results were dismissed and a new census was conducted the
following year in 1963. The new census was once again questioned by the people; however,
instead of the controversy focusing on false numbers it centered on the attempt of one region
dominating another. Although contended, the results of the second census became official which
meant a favorable proportional allocation of governmental representation and revenue for the
Northern Region. The corrupted census revealed to Nigerians the extent to which each regional
government would go to obtain political power.
Accusations of corruption and shady politics were reinforced by the federal elections of
1964. These tainted elections, the first held in the post-independence period, spawned violence
and bitterness among the Nigerian population. These elections were marred by the harassment
of electoral officials, the blatant tampering of election results, and the prevention of the Eastern
region from participating in the election. The post-election period was marked by controversy
and conflict between regions. Among all else, the 1964 elections demonstrated to the population
the fragile nature of the Republic.
By 1965, it was apparent that Nigerian political leaders were more interested in personal
gains than addressing weaknesses in the political system. On January 15, 1966, there was a
military coup that set in motion a series of events which began with an overthrow of the civilian
run First Republic and culminated with the splitting of the nation and the eruption of civil war.
The initial reason for the January 15th coup, claimed by the leaders, was to bring an end to the
tribalism and corruption that became associated with the First Republic’s political establishment.
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In an attempt to remedy the mistakes of the former government, the commanding officer of the
Nigerian army, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an ethnic Igbo, abolished the federal system and
adopted a unitary one. With this, the regional divisions of power were now replaced by a
centralized administration that controlled the military and civil services of each separate
province. The Northern region viewed this move as a way for the Igbo ethnicity to exert
domination over the whole of the nation. In response, on July 29, 1966 a group of northerners
staged a countercoup which resulted in the capture and death of Ironsi and Lieutenant Colonel
Gowon took over power. Over the time since the initial coup, there was continuous violence in
both the North and Eastern regions targeting specific ethnic groups. The Igbos of the East began
questioning if they could ever live in harmony with the rest of Nigeria. As a result, on May 30,
the military governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu declared independence
for the East and the new Independent Republic of Biafra was established accordingly.
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War left between one and three million Nigerians
dead. Not only did the War leave a significant political legacy by maintaining a military run
government in the aftermath, but it also had tremendous consequences for Nigeria’s oil industry,
natural environment, and social communities. In an article from the Nigerian Tide, the federal
military government was urged to recognize how pollution from oil operations was impacting
fishing communities in the wake of the civil war. The Commissioner for Agriculture, Chief
Dappa-Biriye observed “that mineral oil disasters in oil bearing states during and after the recent
civil war have led to considerable spillage of oil into surrounding waters, adding that this had
exterminated marine life which fishermen live.”17 Although pollution was an apparent problem
affecting the living conditions of the residents of oil-bearing regions, the Nigerian government
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continued to implement policies which upheld the colonial traditions of resource control while
they neglected regulatory guidelines.
An example of a policy that supported the agenda of the newly formed political
establishment was the Petroleum Act which essentially repealed the former colonial Minerals Oil
Ordinance. However, while the Petroleum Act of 1969 created a new framework for oil
operations, this piece of legislation, in fact did not significantly break away from the colonial
inspired system. Similar to the colonial Minerals Oil Ordinance, the Petroleum Act was vague, as
well as neglectful toward regulating the oil industry. The Petroleum Act borrowed from the
previously common legislative notion of ‘good oil field practice’ as a way to ensure oil
companies were engaging in environmentally sound activities.18 Not only was this concept not
adequately defined, but it also remained unclear with regard to issues of liability for damage to
the environment. Because of this, many legal cases were brought to Nigerian courts against oil
companies by village communities demanding compensation for damages to property and their
environment. During exploration activity by Agip Oil Company, the people of the village of
Biokponga saw significant damage to their land, crops, economic trees, and fish ponds. As a
result, the village filed legal action against the responsible party, Agip Oil, for compensation
which amounted to N100,000.19 When the case was brought to court, almost two years after the
initial incidents occurred, the final decision on compensation amount was further postponed
because of a lack of sufficient evidence on the side of the plaintiffs. Similar cases of legal
neglect increased in number as oil operations became more widespread throughout the Niger
Delta Region, and little was done by the Nigerian government to amend outstanding legislation.
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The Petroleum Act also stated that all lessees shall “adopt all practicable precautions,
including the provision of up-to-date equipment to prevent pollution and, in the event that
pollution occurs, to take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end it.”20Adherence to this
regulation required environmental safety measure to be in place such as blow-out preventers and
protection of pipelines and tanks. Being that the greatest sum of oil spillage occurred as a result
of equipment failure, at the time when the Act was enacted and to the present day, it was obvious
that the military government, as well as the successive governments, lacked the monitoring
capabilities to enforce the environmental stipulations supported by this particular law.21 The
military government was more concerned with oil production and financial gain and less about
environmental protection. The Petroleum Act established a precedent for oil operations in the
post-colonial Nigerian state, yet similar to regulations enacted during British rule it failed to
contain clear and coherent environmental safeguards against oil pollution.
Not only was pollution from oil spillage becoming a serious problem for the people of oil
rich areas, but also, other environmental impacts were causing distress to the population’s
livelihoods. Unchecked oil operations, both onshore and offshore, sent a fear of extinction
throughout the population of a particular Niger Delta community because of operational
invasiveness and forced migration. An article in the Nigerian Observer detailed that as a result
of offshore and onshore oil operations in the Delta Region, the coast was being continually
exposed to the encroaching sea. Because of this vulnerability the community of Ugoborado had
lost “eight kilometers of homeland to the sea” as well as more “to oil companies by way of wells,
canals, ditches and [had] now found itself driven back to swamp land infested by disease
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carrying mosquitoes.”22 The article further explained that the community “recalled that several
appeals had been made to previous and present governments and feared that further delay may
cause the people more hardship.”23In this particular case, the people of the disappearing
community were not seeking a specific amount of monetary compensation, rather they were
pleading to the federal military government and the oil companies operating in the area to assist
in rehabilitating the area or to aid in finding more suitable places for them to live. The federal
government was aware of the problems facing the coastal communities, such as the one
exemplified in the article, but no action was taken at the time; besides, no companies were held
responsible. In another instance, the people of Ukwa sought assistance from the oil multinational
Shell-BP which had been operating in their homeland for decades. An article in The Nigerian
Observer stated that “Ukwa produces oil but the people had not benefited from the oil produced
in their area.” Dr. Njoku, a spokesman for the Ukwa people claimed, “we have in the past 22
years made passionate appeals and requests to the company to assist us in our development
programmes but the management shunned us.”24 Environmental issues continued to be a major
concern for the people of the oil-bearing regions of the Niger Delta, yet legislation continued to
lack clear and concrete stipulations for environmental protection.
Several laws passed in the 1960s and 1970s presented important environmental related
regulations; however, these regulations were vague, overgeneralized, and due to the lack of
enforcement capabilities, were rendered essentially ineffective. In addition there was also
legislation that was passed during the late 1960s that ostensibly portrayed awareness for the
negative environmental consequences from oil operations; but contained inherent loopholes and
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contradictions which trumped environmental protection by favoring oil producers. An example
of this can be seen with the Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968. The Act, as it read,
“permit[ed] the discharge of hazardous substances or petroleum under certain circumstances,
such as if the escape of oil from a vessel was due to leakage and the leakage was not due to any
want of reasonable care and all reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the discharge.”25
Oil spillage was an inevitable part of conducting oil operations; however, with laws such as the
Petroleum Act and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act guiding the industry, oil spills occurred
regularly throughout the 1960s with little legally enforced consequences for the responsible
party.

The 1970s: OPEC and the Oil Boom
The early 1970s proved to be a time of change for Nigeria’s oil industry. In 1971 Nigeria
joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a way to safeguard
interests in the international market at a time when the Nigerian oil production was escalating.
Membership for Nigeria was an advantage because “OPEC regulat[ed] annual oil production,
and by doing so influenc[ed] international oil prices through such mechanisms as production
quotas and ceilings that all members [were] obliged to obey.”26 OPEC encouraged
indigenization which was also strongly supported by the other oil producing member countries.27
Entrance into OPEC opened the opportunity for Nigerians to hold high skilled positions in the oil
companies; however, because of the educational institutions created by the colonial British
administration that reality would prove complicated. The educational institutions created by the
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British during the colonial era focused more on the arts and culture and neglected the sciences
and applied research. An article from the Nigerian Standard stated, “a definite policy should be
adopted which motivates people in the pure sciences so that a science oriented society that makes
use of available local materials is developed.”28 The article further stated that “in order to
encourage technological inventiveness in Nigeria, there is the need to have a strong science base
in our educational awareness.”29Aside from the problems presented, entrance into OPEC gave
greater power to Nigeria as an oil producing nation on the global oil market and with that came
significant changes to the industry.
There were certain requirements that came along with OPEC membership which
coincided with Nigeria’s attempts toward indigenization. Most importantly OPEC required, as
stipulated in Resolution No. XVI.90, “all member countries to acquire 51 percent of foreign
equity interests and to participate more actively in all aspects of all operations.”30 To prepare the
country for ingress into OPEC Nigeria’s federal government formed the Nigerian National Oil
Corporation (NNOC). This state-owned corporation acted as a mechanism through which the
Nigerian government could actively participate in all aspects of oil production. Additionally, it
set certain provisions concerning profit sharing and royalty collection. The Foreign Enterprises
Decree of 1972 detailed that the Nigerian Government obtain 35 percent of the joint-venture,
Shell-BP. Two years later the NNOC was chosen to represent the federal government in the
Shell-BP joint-venture, and by 1974 the NNOC was controlling 55 percent of the equity from
petroleum production in Nigeria.31 As a result, Shell-BP would be renamed Shell Petroleum
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Development Company of Nigeria; a name by which the company still distinguishes itself
presently.
In 1977, the NNOC was dissolved and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) was formed. The NNPC acted in the same capacity as the previous NNOC, in that the
company supervised oil extraction as well as provided direction for oil companies operating in
Nigeria. To ensure more control of the country’s oil industry Nigeria underwent a national
program of indigenization. Through the indigenization of vital parts of the oil operations, the
establishment of greater governmental control over oil operations, and the allowance of oil
companies to engage in oil exploration at their own risk, the Nigerian government began to
slowly restructure the dynamic of control over the country’s oil resources.32 Exemplified in the
amended Nigerian Federal Constitution, the structure of resource control was outlined within
chapter 350 section 1(1). The constitution specified, “[t]he entire ownership and control of all
petroleum in, under, or upon any lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the
state.”33 The next line provided a more narrowed definition which declares that the application
refers to all land, including land covered by water, which is in Nigeria, is under the territorial
waters of Nigeria, forms part of the continental shelf, or forms part of the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) of Nigeria. In spite of Nigeria’s control of the oil industry, it was more concerned
with oil production than in creating regulatory policies.
During General Gowon tenure of the mid-1970s, millions of naira generated from oil
revenue disappeared from the government. Officials on the federal and state levels both stole
large sums of money from the government through varying methods. Some officials would
simply alter accounting numbers while others would award governmental contracts to friends
32

Ikein, The Impact of Oil, 2-3.
The World Law Guide Legislation Nigeria (Lexadin, 1996-2010),
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwenig.htm (accessed July 28, 2010).
33

50

and in turn receive massive monetary kickback from those contracts. The official corruption of
Nigeria’s oil boom years extended to nearly all facets of governmental programs. Indigenization
was not only focused on the oil industry, during the 1970s many different Nigerian businesses
were indigenizing. The ultimate goal was to take control of economic activity from foreign
investors and place it in the hands of Nigerians. While this scheme increased the number of
businesses owned by Nigerians, it did little to improve the poor living conditions of the average
person. Since the already prosperous, with interests aligned with foreign investors and rentseeking politicians, were the ones primarily investing in Nigerian businesses, the indigenization
process did more to promote governmental corruption and class separation, than to enrich the
livelihoods of the everyday Nigerian. After Gowon’s military government was ousted by a coup
in 1975, a governmental inquiry was launched to examine official corruption during the rule of
the military government. The results of the commission exposed 10 state governors to be guilty
of misusing government funds in excess of 16 million naira.34
Along with an effort to indigenize, the Nigerian government also adopted an economic
policy of import substitution which intended to revamp not only the oil industry but also the
agricultural, steel, and iron industries to name a few. Advocates of import substitution posited
replacing foreign imports with domestic production. The policy failed in Nigeria for a number of
reasons. First, the technical foundation, such as a skilled labor force and infrastructure to support
the massive revamping of domestic industrialization was simply not present in Nigeria. Second,
while there was a significant increase in the physical transfer of technology through the import of
large-scale machinery and equipment, Nigeria lacked the technical expertise to operate the
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machinery. Lastly, because of a lack of standardization measures, when equipment failed the
Nigerian government imported more instead of fixing the equipment locally. 35
Throughout the indigenization of the oil industry, environmental issues remained a
concern of the population of the oil regions; however, little was done by the government to
enforce any regulation managing pollution. Additionally, with oil production at a record level at
the end of the 1970s there was much social contention created over how oil revenues would be
dispersed across the nation. The head of Shell-BP released an article in the Nigerian Observer
that approximately 2.4 million barrels of oil was being produced per day and that his company
had found more oil than has been produced.36 During the 1970s Nigeria experienced a booming
economy because of the rising price of oil on the global market as well as a massive increase in
crude oil production and export levels. Not coincidently, the oil-rich states of the Niger Delta
wished for it to be distributed based on the quantity of oil derived from each state, whereas the
non-producing regions opposed that, and wanted it to be based on population.37 However, apart
from the revenue debate, one thing remained certain: environmental concerns took an ancillary
position to economic gain.
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Year

Production

Export

Domestic Consumption

1970

395,689

383,455

12,234

1971

558,689

542,545

16,144

1972

665,295

650,640

14,655

1973

719,379

695,627

23,752

1974

823,320

795,710

27,610

1975

660,148

627,638

32,510

1976

758,058

736,822

21,236

1977

766,055

715,240

50,815

1978

696,324

674,125

22,199

1979

845,463

807,685

37,778

1980

760,117

656,260

103,857

Figure 6: Crude Oil Production and Export (Barrels) 38

An op-ed article in the Nigerian Chronicle, warned the Nigerian government to “avoid
the mistakes of some developed countries who embark on economic development without regard
to the effect of pollution.”39 It further stated that Nigeria was not only developing, but it was
also in a great hurry to develop. Because of this, the nation needed to pay careful attention to
certain environmental impacts associated with development such as water pollution, soil erosion,
destruction of forests, and the effects of oil exploration. The setting up of a permanent body to
study and make recommendations on how pollution could be checked effectively was proposed
by the article; however, no environmental enforcement entity was established. Although the
Nigerian government was now taking a more active role in the oil industry the laws created to
38
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regulate it were deliberately in favor of the oil companies, especially with situations where oil
pollution charges were brought against them from the social community.
Multinational oil companies were gradually controlling major governmental decisions
with regard to the oil industry, and as a result the people of the oil-producing regions were
desperate for significant change to the existing policies. In an opinion piece for the Nigerian
Tide, A.B.D. Nedom of the University of Ibadan, wrote on the need for a national pollution
commission to regulate the unfair practices outlined in certain pieces of Nigerian legislation.
Nedom stated that large oil companies, “companies bearing either Dutch or combination of
Anglo-Dutch or French-Dutch names”, almost always secured exclusive oil exploration rights,
while the “indigenous contracting companies [were] never within such contracts.”40 He further
explained that the meager, if any, monetary compensation rewarded to the indigenous population
in the event that their land or economic property was destroyed, was leading to social conflicts
with pollutions. Because the majority of the people of oil-exploited areas were either farmers or
fishermen the consequences from oil pollution essentially left them with no form of livelihood,
yet taxes were still required to be paid to the government. Nedom highlighted how decisions
over exploitation were made outside the country by large companies which resulted in little or no
say by the people over how resources and revenues should be collected and distributed. “The
crumbs of the operations which our indigenous contractors have [were] the supply of cheapcheap labour or transporting chemicals and building huts at the site of operations.”41 These
social problems associated with pollution were intensified with the changing political climate as
well as certain legislative acts passed during the latter part of the 1970s
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In 1979, the current military government, headed by General Obasanjo, willingly handed
over political power to the civilian administration of the Second Republic under President
Shagari. The Second Republic inherited an economy in decline. The financial windfalls
experienced from the oil boom in the earlier years of the decade were followed by economic
decline from the oil bust of the late 1970s. Corruption was still rampant in the political system;
however, with Nigeria now a debtor state, the lavish lifestyles of politicians became more
pronounced within the context of a poor economic climate. According to Ayittey, “wealth
exported by top government officials was unofficially estimated by Western diplomats at $5
billion to $7 billion during the short-lived second republic, the most corrupt in Nigeria’s
history.”42
The constitution adopted by the Second Republic fostered corruption. Modeled by the
US Constitution, the so called presidential constitution of the Second Republic lent power to the
executive branch to fill high ranking offices with individuals of the president’s choosing. The
spoils system of politics undermined the national reform agenda by filling potentially lucrative
government jobs with friends and followers of the president. In Democracy and Prebendal
Politics in Nigeria, Richard Joseph aptly utilizes Max Weber’s definition of prebendalism, as
applied to feudal societies where public office was attained by an individual in return for loyal
service to the authority, to describe Nigeria’s political organization during the Second Republic.
Joseph contends that the official roles and responsibilities of political office in Nigeria took a
subsidiary role to the “justifying principle that offices should be competed for and utilized for the
personal benefit of the office-holders as well as of their reference or support group.”43 He further
concludes that Nigerian prebendal politics, along with “clentelism,” destabilized the democratic
42
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institutions of Nigeria rendering the survival of a workable democratic system essentially
impossible.
Additionally, the new legislation of the late 1970s was more concerned with reversing
economic decline than it was in addressing disastrous environmental concerns. The Land Use
Decree of 1978, later renamed the Land Use Act of 1979, neutralized all traditional impediments
to land acquisition under traditional law which freed up land for oil activity. The Act stated that
all land where oil was explored, produced, or transported, was owned solely by the state. Oil
companies essentially paid a rent directly to the state for the authorization to conduct oil
operations on that land. In the likely case that environmental damage occurred, under the
regulatory guidelines of the Land Use Act it was only the state that was legally permitted to
protest, not the former inhabitant occupying the land.44 While this Act placed considerable
control with the Nigerian Government, the most controversial aspect of the new law was the
government’s authority to revoke any inhabitant’s right to occupancy for reasons of overriding
public interest. The Land Use Act incited land-centered conflicts among the people of the Niger
Delta which led to further fragmentation of an already fragile social dynamic.45 With the Act in
place, the people of the Niger Delta, who lived where the bulk of oil exploration and operations
were conducted, were essentially turned from legal inhabitants to unlawful intruders on their own
lands. According to legal scholar Jedrzej Frynas “[t]o sum it up, the Land Use Act allowed oil
companies to gain easier access to the land and to the oil resources through the government.”46
The provisions written into the Land Use Act rendered the population of the Niger Delta
essentially unrepresented in the event that pollution was caused to their environment. Upon the
occasion that protest did arise, the government was quick, as well as right within the law to
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deploy its military to silence the opposition. This left little remediating action possible for the
people most impacted by the environmental destruction of their land. While the Act was
composed to vest ownership of land to the state to be “held in trust and administered for the use
and benefit of all Nigerians” the implications diverged greatly from the supposed goal. 47 The
Land Use Act undoubtedly favored oil company interests over that of the people of Niger Delta.
This in turn induced more reckless oil operations as seen through increased incidents of oil
spillage as well as greater amounts of gas flaring sites. This led to further environmental
degradation with little or no liability costs from the responsible oil companies.

Harmful Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Operations
Since the beginning of oil production in the mid-twentieth century there have been
numerous oil spills in Nigeria’s coastal zones that have negatively impacted the natural and
social environments of the Niger River Delta. In 1978, a tank failed at Shell Petroleum
Development Company’s Forcados Terminal resulting in nearly 600,000 barrels of oil being
released into the coastal zone. Also in 1978, there was an incident of oil spillage from a pipeline
leading to the terminal at Bonny. The Bonny terminal oil spill was estimated to have released
close to 500 million barrels of oil along a 25 kilometer stretch of pipeline. It was reported that
oil on the water surface was 2.5 centimeters thick. Two years later in 1980, Texaco’s Funiwa-5
well experienced a blowout resulting in approximately 400,000 barrels of oil to be discharged.48
On average, according to statistics produced from SPDC, there were over 220 incidents of oil
spillage per year. During the fifteen year period from 1976 to 1991 there were a reported 2,976
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spills in Nigeria.49Soil and ground water were continually being contaminated from oil spills
across the oil producing region of the Niger River Delta; however, oil spillage was not the only
way in which oil operations were impacting the natural and social environments of the Niger
River communities.
Year

Number of
Spills

Quantity Spilled

Quantity
Recovered

Net Quantity
Lost to
Environment

Percentage of
Quantity Lost to
Environment

1976

128

26,157.00

7,135.05

19,021.50

72.72

1978

154

489,294.75

39,1445.00

97,849.75

20.00

1980

241

600,511.02

42,416.83

558,094.19

92.94

1982

257

42,841.00

2,171.40

40,669.60

94.03

1984

151

40,209.00

1,644.80

38,564.20

95.91

1986

155

12,905.00

552.00

12,353.00

95.72

1988

208

9,172.00

1,955.00

7,217.00

78.69

Figure 7: Oil Spills in the Petroleum Industry (1976-1988) in Barrels50

Compounding the damage that was being caused by oil spillage, there was also the
harmful practice of gas flaring. Gas flaring, the process by which natural gas was burned out of
the crude oil in its basic state during extraction, began at the start of commercialized oil
production in the 1960s. Because of an inadequate infrastructure in place to effectively store and
utilize the extracted natural gas, approximately 75 percent of it was flared. On a global scale,
Nigeria’s Niger Delta flared about 20 percent of the collective world total and as a result
approximately 11 million metric tons of methane was released into the atmosphere.51 While the
release of methane was harmful it was not the only product released into the air, there was also
49
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hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide which all contributed to a worsening of air
quality for the social communities living in oil-producing areas.
Year

Outputs

Utilization

Quantity Flared

Percentage Flared

1970

8,039

72

7,957

99

1971

12,975

185

12,790

99

1972

17,122

274

16,848

98

1973

21,882

295

21,487

98

1974

27,882

323

26,776

99

1975

18,656

659

15,333

98

1976

21,279

972

20,617

97

1977

21,924

1,866

20,952

96

1978

2,306

1,546

19,440

91

1979

27,619

2,951

26,073

94

1980

24,551

3,442

22,904

93

1981

17,113

3,244

14,817

83

1982

15,382

3,438

11,940

78

1983

15,192

3,723

11,946

79

1984

16,255

4,822

13,917

79

1985

18,569

4,794

12,291

80

1986

17,085

5,516

14,737

74

1987

20,253

6,323

18,730

72

1988

25,053

6,343

21,820

73

Figure 8: Gas Production and Utilization in Nigeria (Million Cubic Meters)52

The negative impacts to the environment from gas flaring included, but were not limited
to, air pollution, acid rain, and soil and crop contamination. The harmful gases that were released
into the air as byproducts of gas flaring were absorbed and returned to the earth as soot through
rainfall. This polluted rain covered houses, crops and other various plants with thick deposits of
52
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black soot. This soot as well as acid rain also, found its way into local streams and rivers which
further added to water contamination. Gas flaring not only contaminated the natural
environment but also interfered with the social community’s ability to maintain healthy living
conditions. Harmful human effects ranged from respiratory illness, such as asthma and
bronchitis, to hearing and skin problems. In addition, an elevated rate of birth complications had
been associated with gas flaring.53 Some flare sites which were situated near villages and close
to homes had been continually flaring gas on a twenty-four hour basis throughout the
introduction of mass oil production in the Niger Delta.54
Because of the nature of gas flaring operations it was difficult to quantitatively evaluate
its environmental impacts; however, communities have been distressed by the practice since its
commencement. In 1972, a legal case was brought against Shell-BP by the Rumuokani
community over the harmful effects of gas flaring, targeting the heat, noise, and vibration
emanating from the flare site. They claimed that flaring operations had destroyed trees and other
foliage as well as damaged houses which were located near the site. The verdict of the case went
in favor of the oil companies. The judge, upon receiving word from an on scene observer,
concluded that there was simply not enough evidence to support the claims by the plaintiffs and
the charges were dismissed.55 Studies conducted to determine the exact impact of gas flaring on
soil, flora, and fauna in the oil producing region revealed that “palm trees most of which were
wild, that were within a radius of one kilometer of the flare sites, grew tall without bearing fruits
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before dying finally.”56 Moreover, pumpkin and tomato crops also did not grow within the same
one kilometer radius due to a dehydrating of the soil.
Furthermore, regulations were set into place in 1984 to monitor and limit gas flaring
operations; however, oil multinationals continued the practice with little or no government
intervention. The law was the result of an amendment to the Associated Gas Re-injection Act of
1979. The Act required gas to be re-injected back into the earth by the companies conducting the
operations or for them to develop a comprehensive scheme to utilize the excess gas. In addition
to the NNPC’s unwillingness to invest in gas development, there were other reasons for the
ineffectiveness of the gas flaring regulations. First, the Nigerian government granted exemptions
to oil companies which offered them the leeway to operate outside federal law. In 1985, the
same year the Gas Re-injections Act was amended, 55 of Shell’s 84 active wells were exempted
from the flaring regulations. Second, the monetary penalties associated with the gas flaring were
minor, making it cheaper for companies to flare gas than it was for them to invest in gas
development programs.57 To emphasize this point, it would have cost Chevron approximately 56
million US dollars in the late 1980s to convert gas operations to be in compliance with the Gas
Re-injection Act. With maintaining the status-quo, the fines weighed against the company for
flaring gas tallied roughly 1 million US dollars.58 It was clearly more economically beneficial for
Chevron to continue with the operations that were already in place. Another company operating
and flaring gas in the area, Mobil, stated that the reason they flared gas instead of processing it
for local use was because “the company was only authorized by law to exploit crude oil and
nothing more.”59 These examples clearly showed that the Nigerian government was more
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concerned about revenues generated from oil production then they were about implementing
regulatory policy.
Even with the mounting environmental problems of the 1970s and the mid-1980s,
regulatory policies continued to absent from government programs. It was not until 1988 that the
Nigerian government set up an agency specifically dedicated to the development of an
institutional framework for environmental management as a response to ecological disasters.
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was created by the FEPA Act of 1988
and was later amended by Act #59 in 1992. The agency’s main functions were to analyze
possible environmental situations and advise the government on probable catastrophic issues.
Not only was the Agency riddled with contention and contradiction, the laws written to support
FEPA’s mission were full of loopholes and vague language so that oil companies could continue
to avoid liability of spills. Above all, it was apparent that economic gain took the primary
position over regulatory policy.
Nigeria’s road to political independence began almost as soon as the British colonized the
territory at the start of the twentieth century. With the passing of two world wars, an increasing
number of “nationalist” movements, and a changing global political economy, Britain realized it
was no longer feasible to continue the direct occupation of Nigeria. Nigeria’s independence was
achieved through a constitutional process which granted Nigerians greater participation in the
colonial system between 1940-1960. Nigeria’s independence constitution was, however,
defective. The constitution sanctioned Nigerian into three official regions. This ensured that
political parties would be formed along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, this would undermine the
creation of a Nigerian nationalist movement. Party loyalty at the regional level was gained
through a system of patronage that has been aptly described by Frederick Cooper as
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“clientelism.” The post-colonial state was also a “gate-keeper” state. The post-colonial state did
not break new ground; it built on the institutions and structures that had been created during the
colonial period. With regard to the oil industry, the policies of the post-colonial state intensified
oil exploration and production. The policies also ensured that Nigeria would have a greater share
of the equity from oil revenues. Greater share of the revenue did not translate a control of the
technology and infrastructure of oil production. In spite of the indigenization program that was
implemented by the Nigerian government during the tenure of Gowon the oil corporation still
maintained control of the most strategic areas of oil exploration and production. Nigeria did not
have the technological capabilities to control gas flaring nor did they have the technical expertise
to monitor oil company operations both on shore and off shore. In the context of the continued
dependent relationship between Nigeria and multinational corporations, the successive
governments of 1960-1988 failed to implement regulatory policies regarding the oil industry. As
a result, the FEPA Act of 1988, although ambitions, has not been properly implemented.

63

CHAPTER 3: RESISTANCE AND CIVILIAN RULE

Chapter three examines the time period from 1988 to the present. This chapter analyzes
the social and environmental consequences of over forty years of oil exploration, exploitation
and production in Nigeria’s Niger Delta against the backdrop of important political and
economic changes. The outstanding feature of Nigerian history in the 1980s was the
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the military dictatorship
of General Babangida. The SAP was recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and was the product of structural weaknesses in the Nigerian economy that date back to the
colonial period. The Nigerian economy since the mid-1970s has been dominated by an
overdependence on crude oil exports. The failure to diversify the Nigerian economy has made it
vulnerable to the fluctuations in the world market. The provisions of the SAP included but were
not limited to the devaluation of Nigeria’s currency, the liberalization of the economy through
the reduction of tariffs, and the deregulation of the economy through the removal of government
controls. The implication of SAP with regard to the activities of multinational oil companies in
Nigeria’s oil industry was that the government would have less control over the operational
aspects of the industry.
This chapter argues that the non-implementation of regulatory policies by the postcolonial Nigerian state has led to the decimation of the agricultural and marine resources of vast
areas of Nigeria’s Niger Delta oil-production area. The destruction of the “ecosystem” and the
concomitant diminution of economic opportunities have created what Frederick Cooper calls
“labor reserves.” Deprived of a means of livelihood, large numbers of youths with nothing to
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sell but their labor power have become key elements in the resistance to the activities of the
multinational oil corporations in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
Although the resistant movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained some attention by
the global community, the collective message of environmental protection has been continually
silenced by the successive Nigerian governments both military and civilian. One of the most
noted examples of this was the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP
members in 1995. Furthermore, as resistant movements became more aggressive and violent in
nature, instances of environmental destruction have increased accordingly. Reasons vary, but
central to this view is that the sabotage of oil production facilities and pipelines by Nigerian
militant groups was causing damage to local ecological areas through oil spillage. Compounding
the problem has been the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,” on the black market with profits
directly funding further militant activity.

FEPA and the Rise of MOSOP
As stated in the preceding chapter the main goal of the newly formed Federal
Environmental Protection Agency was to analyze possible environmental situations and advise
the government on probable catastrophic issues. At the time of FEPA’s creation the Nigerian
government was once again controlled by a military leader, General Babangida. Nigeria’s
Second Republic had been characterized by official corruption, ethnic tensions, and nonimplementation of government policies. After a failed general election in 1983, the military
seized power in a coup led by General Buhari, on December 31, 1983. Buhari’s regime was
overthrown a year and a half later by General Babangida who took over as head of state on
August 27, 1985. Under the rule of the second military government since the overthrow of the
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Second Republic in 1983, the Nigerian economy continued its downward spiral. In an attempt to
remedy the economic situation, Babangida implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) which essentially endorsed the deregulation and privatization of the national economy.
While some positive impacts resulted from the SAP, the overall social effects from the program
were devastating for the average Nigerian. With the implementation of the SAP, unemployment
increased and governmental corruption became more institutionalized. By 1989 there was not
one governmental institution or agency that was not infiltrated by systematic corruption; this
included the newly formed Federal Environmental Protection Agency.
Federal control of FEPA created a serious conflict of interest within its internal structure
which undermined the implementation of regulatory policies for the oil industry. As stated in the
preceding chapter, the Land Use Act of 1979 declared governmental responsibility of all lands in
which oil operations were conducted. This in turn made the government liable when pollution
occurred in those areas. However, because the Act also specified that the government could
legally revoke any inhabitant’s right to land, displaced persons were essentially rendered
powerless to resist because according to the law they had no right to be on the government
owned land in the first place. The Land Use Act provided the government no social impetus to
stop the destruction of the environment. To further compromise FEPA’s central mission, and
more profoundly the overall dynamic of Niger Delta environmental degradation, was the state’s
ownership and influence in the Agency’s decision and policy making process.
FEPA’s environmental protection and control objective, as created by the FEPA Act of
1988 was inherently flawed. The Agency’s governing council consisted of members who not
only contributed to the environmental decisions made by the Agency; they were also
representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. This created a conflict of interest
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because Ministry officials could directly influence FEPA’s regulatory policies concerning the oil
industry. Also, the FEPA Act itself contained certain loop holes written into the regulatory
language that allowed for the discharge of hazardous material into the environment when and
where it was explicitly authorized by Nigerian law. An example of this federal authorization was
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act which stated that a “vessel may discharge oil into Nigerian
waters if the escape of oil was due to leakage and the leakage was not due to any want of
reasonable care and all reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the discharge.”60 This
example, shown by the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, destroys any deterrents FEPA created to
manage environmental pollution.
As a response to the devastated social and environmental conditions of Nigeria’s Delta
Region because of decades of unregulated oil operations, the Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1990 in an attempt to raise global awareness. Through
non-violent protest, MOSOP proactively denounced the acts of ‘genocide’ inflicted on the Delta
people.61 The Ogoni people’s environmental message was clear. In 1990, MOSOP summed up
their list of demands for ecological, political, and socio-economic justice within the framework
of their “Ogoni Bill of Rights”. Along with pleas for adequate representation and a larger share
of their territory’s oil revenue, was the demand for protection against the environmental
degradation of their land. When the document was sent to General Babangida’s Armed Forces
Ruling Council it received no response. Also, no response was received when MOSOP
contacted local oil producers, Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) and demanded compensation in the amount of 4 billion US dollars for the
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environmental destruction caused to their territory, as well as 6 billion US dollars in outstanding
taxes and royalties. This apparent neglect demonstrated the agenda of the Nigerian government
and the oil companies. When MOSOP’s demands gained the attention of the international
community, Nigeria’s military government stepped in to silence their opposition voice.
In the concluding months of 1995, nine members of MOSOP were convicted of murder,
and subsequently sentenced to death by hanging. The nine prisoners were initially taken into
custody for their alleged involvement in the murder of four Ogoni leaders in May, 1994. For
more than eight months the defendants were tortured, beaten, and forced to live incommunicado
from the rest of society. In addition, the prisoners were regularly deprived of adequate food,
water, and medical attention. Among the nine MOSOP members convicted was organization
president, and acclaimed author and environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Ogoni
nine’s executions in 1995 marked the culmination of negative impact the oil industry has had on
the natural and social environments of Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
The Babangida administration began the process for the transition to civilian rule almost
as soon as he took power in January 1986. In 1989, the military government released a draft of
the new constitution that would be implemented by the Third Republic. Elections were held on
June 12, 1993 and were considered by the Nigerian people as the most free, fair, and peaceful
elections in Nigeria to date. With the prospect of having to relinquish power, Babangida
annulled the results of the elections on June 23, and subsequently remained in power.
Babangida’s actions generated an explosion of protests, demonstrations, and riots across Nigeria.
The uprising diverged along regional lines, where protestors in the South called for a restoration
of results from the June 12th elections while in the North, pro-Babangida rallies were organized
by the government. As a result, widespread violence broke out and a state of emergency was
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declared in many parts of the nation. Babangida, under the crisis conditions, could no longer
hold legitimacy and was removed from his position by a military coup on November 17, 1993.
General Sani Abacha assumed power and quickly established has name as a ruthless and
authoritarian leader. Abacha showed no signs of relinquishing power and abolished all the
existing measures and institutions created by the Third Republic’s constitution. The Ogoni trials
solidified Abacha’s reputation for brutality. Prior to his 1995 conviction, Ken Saro-Wiwa was
harassed and arrested multiple times by Abacha’s security forces, including two separate
occasions in 1993 for unlawful assembly, seditious intention, and seditious publication.
Concurrently while Saro-Wiwa and the other accused MOSOP members awaited trial,
governmental security forces instigated inter-ethnic killings where no redemptive legal action
was brought upon them.62 During the month of June 1994, more than fifty Ogoni were executed
by military security forces as well as over 180 wounded during village attacks in Rivers State.63
During these attacks security forces were reported to have fired their weapons at random, looted
property, and burned local homes. In the village of Uegwere Bo-ue specifically, two separate
attacks occurred within four days of each other, resulting in nine dead, one of which was a 10year-old boy.
The accusations and convictions brought against Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP
activists were undoubtedly politically motivated. Proof of this reality can be seen when placed
within the context of the murderous events which occurred in Rivers State during the previous
five years. Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP activists were detained illegally without
62
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formal charges from the time they were initially apprehended in May 1994 until February 6,
1995 when the first five were brought to court and notified of the charges weighed against them.
A special court, named the Civil Disturbances Tribunal, was established by Nigeria’s military
government to try cases in connection with civil unrest.64 The tribunal acted more as an arm of
government than a court of law. To further emphasize the view that the MOSOP nine’s case was
politically motivated, the tribunal’s verdicts had no official effect until confirmed and amended
by the government. Additionally, according to the Nigerian constitution, within the rights of
Nigerian citizenship, the defendants should have been notified of their charges within twentyfour hours of arrest, which never took place. In addition to political motivation, the tribunal also
made decisions and verdicts that were proven to be directly influenced by governmental entities
working outside the Nigerian judicial system.
From the time of initial arrest in May 1994, the military government controlled every
aspect of the Ogoni nine’s detainment and trial. The members of this specially appointed
tribunal included both high and lower ranking military officers, and even though chaired by a
retired judge, the selected members of the court shockingly were not required to possess any
legal training. In addition, the military officers who served on the tribunal were directly
influenced by governmental authorities as their employment, promotion opportunities, and
pensions, were dependent on successful and effective military service. Perhaps the most publicly
transparent example of the military government’s control and prejudgment was displayed with
the initiative to go to trial. The decision to proceed to trial was confirmed before prosecution
applied for commencement of the first trial which was on January 28, 1995. The federal
government announced that the trial would commence before any suspect was formally charged
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as well as before the prosecution presented any evidence for the tribunal to review.65 Also, the
tribunal’s final verdict held no legal authority until either accepted or rejected by federal
government officials. Therefore, the decision could be made in isolation from the pressure of
public judicial or legal processes.
The subjective stance demonstrated by the tribunal directly conflicted with the
international standards for fair and just trial proceedings. With the case of the Ogoni nine, the
tribunal conducted two trials simultaneously. This was not only prejudicial to all of the
defendants involved, but it also exposed an absence of equality and adherence to the basic citizen
rights protected within the legal framework of Nigeria’s Federal Constitution.66 Andrew Rowell
of Greenpeace observed that “the Ogoni’s situation may seem more about human rights than the
environment. After all, Nigeria has a history of puppet dictators, military rule and has denied its
people democratic elections and minority rights.”67 While accurate with his assertion of human
rights violations, Rowell overlooked a principal certainty that, “[e]nvironmental and human
rights for the Nigerian people, particularly in the Niger Delta, cannot be separated.”68 The tragic
fate of the Ogoni nine exposed to the global community considerably more than a story about the
suppression of human rights by a corrupt judicial and political system. It revealed the extent the
Nigerian military government, would go to in order to silence opposition voice for the
environmental destruction caused from decades of conducting oil operations in the Niger Delta.
Abacha’s regime not only blatantly disregarded human rights, but also engaged in corrupt
political and economic activities that would continue to sustain poor living conditions for the
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Nigerian people. Abacha died on June 8, 1998 from an apparent heart attack and power was
handed over to General Abubakar. Abubakar made steps toward the transition to civilian rule
and as a result Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president of the new Fourth Republic on May 29,
1999 with Abubakar as his vice president. Although the elections of 1999 were widely agreed to
have been corrupted by vote rigging by all parties, the prospect of ending abusive military rule
overshadowed the concerns over the legitimacy of the elections. Although the economic policies
of Obasanjo did help somewhat to improve Nigeria’s reputation within the global community, on
the domestic level Nigeria was still stricken by massive poverty and environmental degradation.
The prolonged degradation of the environment began to be perceived by many Nigerians
living in the oil producing Delta as environmental terrorism. As one Delta resident reported,
“Since this year there has been two major oil spills in my village of K. Dere alone,
destroying farms and marine life, but as we speak, the rivers, streams and farms are still
covered in the oil spills. It is this grave, odious, pervasive if not callous environmental
terrorism that should elevate what is happening to our environment to the realm of crimes
against nature, and punished as such.”69

More than a decade after the tragic executions of the Ogoni Nine, similar environmental
language resurfaced. The claimed acts of environmental terrorism parallel the acts of genocide
declared by Ken Saro-Wiwa. Furthermore, the environmental and social situations were
blatantly disregarded by both the Nigerian state as well as the multinational oil companies
operating in the Niger River basin underscoring their collaboration.
A Niger Delta resident explained to a reporter,"[t]hree weeks ago, we discovered some
black substances in our river, which we later found out was oil spill from an SPDC [Shell
Petroleum Development Company] pipeline at Okpare-Olomu.” He continued, “We then
wrote a letter to SPDC through Mr. Temu Aghwarentefe, the Community Relations
Officer who later directed us to another office. But up to this moment, we have not heard
from management of the company"70
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Similar testimonies of negligence and damage to local fishing and agricultural areas by
Shell were widespread across the oil producing regions of the Niger Delta. Nigerian
environmental rights activist Dr. Godwin Uyi-Ojo was accurate in stating “environmental
degradation fuels underdevelopment and greed”71 Poor environmental conditions added to the
overall social frustration of the Niger Delta population.

Sabotage
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, sabotage of oil sites and pipelines continued to be a
major problem for not only the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals operating in the
area, but also the ecology of oil producing-regions of the Niger Delta. A popular view among
academic scholars and the media was the Niger Delta people were reacting to the recklessness of
the Nigerian government and oil companies in the native communities. Militant groups have
formed as a way to respond to environmental destruction caused by oil operations and
governmental oppression. These groups act with tremendous force striking oil instillations with
the intent of kidnaping oil employees and ciphering oil for sale on the black market. The stolen
oil is referred to as blood oil and the profit from this theft funds these militant groups’
acquisition of weapons and ammunitions.72 Since an overwhelming number of these acts of
sabotage happen in remote areas beyond the capability of surveillance equipment, untold damage
has occurred to the complex land and water systems of the Niger Delta.73 Sabotage adds a new
and multifaceted dynamic to the study of environmental degradation in Nigeria’s oil-bearing
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region. Militant groups, mainly comprised of Niger Delta residents, are willfully destroying their
own environment as a way to demonstrate to the oil companies and the government that they are
frustrated with political corruption and lack of safeguards against environmental destruction.
The resistance movements generated by the trade of blood oil differ starkly from those
which began with the formation of MOSOP in the early 1990s; however, the collective message
is similar.74 MOSOP was formed to represent the shared voice of the exploited Delta people.
With Saro-Wiwa as their movement leader, they organized non-violent protests which fought
against the destruction of the environment by oil multinationals. Similar to how the British
colonial government was quick to silence opposition to colonial rule, the Nigerian government
did not hesitate to intervene on behalf of the oil industry rather than its own people because of
the prospect of quick money. The resistance and violence that has formed as a reaction to
environmental degradation and the oppression of basic human rights by the Nigerian government
working closely with oil multinationals has essentially left the population of Nigeria’s oilbearing region in a state of perpetual despair. The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight
MOSOP leaders represent the culmination of negative impacts the oil industry has had on the
physical and social environments of the Niger Delta.
The formation of the terrorist group the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
(MEND) in late 2005 epitomizes the militant reaction against the oppressive actions of the
government and oil companies. It is also a product of the social and economic problems created
by the destruction of the environment of the Niger Delta by the multinational corporations.
According to Jomo Gbomo, a representative of one of MEND’s branches, the majority of the
group’s members are volunteers and are not limited to the Ijaw ethnic group. He goes further to
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say that members come from different communities across the Niger Delta oil-producing area
such as Urhobo, Ikwerri, and Itsekiri.75 This reflects the fact that the resistance to the operations
of the oil companies is not influenced by ethnic factors but rather by social and economic
concerns. The available historical sources suggest that a vast majority of the MEND militants are
unemployed youths.76 According to MEND leaders, the group was formed from a number of
smaller Niger Delta militant organizations as a way to draw greater media attention to the Niger
Delta situation. The group recognized that one semi-united faction could generate more media
coverage than several smaller groups could.
MEND’s ultimate goals are “for the Niger Delta people to receive a greater share of the
Niger Delta’s oil and natural gas revenues, to end corruption in the Niger Delta
governments, and for the release of Niger Delta militants that have been arrested by the
Nigerian military and police.”77

MEND is especially noted for their violent attacks on oil facilities and oil personnel
working in the Niger Delta. Their first recorded violent operation was on Shell Oil Company’s
Opobo pipeline, located in Delta State on December 20, 2005. MEND’s power derives from its
lack of formal structure. It is essentially an umbrella organization with a decentralized power
structure and open membership. Moreover, militants frequently operate in small groups with
many leaders claiming responsibility for the violent attacks; however, when missions require
greater participation, MEND easily acquires the needed volunteers from the pool of unemployed
youths. Because of MEND’s fractured, yet effective autonomy, it makes it extremely difficult
for Nigerian governmental police forces to launch counter-attacks against the group.
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As a result of the continuous attacks by MEND and other militant groups in the Delta
Region, a recent report conducted by the Research Institute of Economic and Peace marked
Nigeria as the sixth most dangerous nation in Africa. The report took into account the risk of
renewed fighting, the resurgence of political instability, and terrorist threats.78 In an attempt to
curb the violence generated by MEND, the Nigerian government implemented an amnesty
program on June 25, 2009. The program granted unconditional amnesty to militants in the Niger
Delta and also established a training and development program for recovering youths. As it
were, over 25,000 former militants participated in the program; however, the violence continues
between governmental security forces and armed gangs in the Niger Delta region. In 2006 alone,
there were over 200 reported kidnappings of oil workers. According to Soni Daniel, between
2006 and 2008, “the militants had through a combination of strategies-bombing of oil facilities,
bunkering, kidnapping and harassment of oil workers cut Nigeria’s oil supply by over one
million barrels per day and caused significant setback to the industry and the nation’s
economy.”79
The environmental and political damages caused as a result of the blood oil trade,
militant activity, and governmental and oil company neglect, has generated serious social
consequences for the Niger Delta people. Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has
drastically affected social relations, migration trends, and national perception.
According to a study by Nigerian scholar V.T. Jike, “the consequences of social
disequilibrium (e.g., the ubiquity of social miscreants [area boys], juvenile delinquents,
and other deviant behaviors) cannot be understood independently of environmental
problems that stem from warped development initiative that roundly undermines the
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existential base of the Niger-Delta peoples.”80

Indeed, environmental degradation has led to urban overcrowding as a result of migrations out of
the Delta region because reckless oil operations have created an unlivable environment. Groups
of rebellious youths have formed who fight against organized authority fueled by a collective
feeling of powerlessness. A new sense of class-consciousness has been created which is
emphasized through the combined conception of economic deprivation and environmental
degradation.81 These migrations are influencing social relation within Nigeria’s already
overpopulated cities. They have caused increased levels of violence and insecurity in urban
centers.82
Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has not only affected social equilibrium
and urban demographics, but also traditional ideals of paternalism among the people of the Niger
Delta. Jike explains that because of the unrelenting exploitation of natural resources, activism
within the communities has created a resilient sub-culture composed of village youths. He
further claims that the new youth, the ones that observed their fathers having their lands stolen
and exploited in front of them, are migrating to urban centers or joining militant movements.
Chief Inegite of a village community located near Oloibiri claims that “[p]rolonged
disappointment and post-colonial generational change had bred Delta youths who were
angrier, louder and more assertively militant that their fathers.” Inegite further adds that
“none of us, old or young, big or small, is happy about this. But we are happy that, unlike
yesteryear, we have people who will shout, shout and shout for us.”83
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There are mixed opinions of the situation in the Niger Delta. Paradoxically, local people
react to the oil companies’ blatant neglect of Nigerian environmental laws, by breaking the law
themselves; acquiring oil illegally through bunkering operations. When their resistance efforts
get obstructed by Nigerian police forces, it demonstrates to the population that they are
essentially being disciplined for performing tasks that should be the responsibility of the
government.84 Moreover, blood oil bunkering has not only negatively impacted the Nigerian
environment it also affected the economy both on the domestic and international level,
challenged social orders, and sustained corruption within Nigerian political structures. Although
the actions the militants are performing are against the law as well as counterproductive to the
cleanup of the environment, they still carry with them a powerful message concerning the
government and oil industries’ neglect of safety and environmental regulations. Evidenced by
the politics involved with the clean-up and compensation decisions as a result of the massive
offshore oil spill by Shell oil company in late 2011.
In December, 2011 approximately 40,000 barrels of crude oil were released into the
marine environment 75 miles off the coast of the Niger Delta while conducting transfer
operations from a floating oil platform to a tanker. Satellite observation of the spill estimated a
contaminated area of 70 kilometers long and covering over 923 square kilometers of surface
water area.85 To add context to the oil spillage problem, the U.N. conducted a study in 2011
producing truly staggering results. In the U.N. report, Shell and the Nigerian Government were
criticized “for contributing to 50 years of pollution in a region of the Niger Delta which it says
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needs the world’s largest ever oil clean-up, costing an initial $1 billion and taking up to 30
years.”86
The mid-1980s witnessed the IMF inspired Structural Adjustment Programme. The SAP
had considerable negative consequences for the Nigerian economy. It led to widespread
unemployment, increased inflation, and deepening poverty in not only urban centers but also
rural areas. It was characterized by immense political change as evidenced by the seizure of
power by the military in 1986, then again in 1993, and then the return to democratic rule in 1999.
Although the successive governments in Nigeria instituted certain regulatory policies, such as the
FEPA act, they were not properly implemented. The continued assault on the Niger Delta
environment by an unregulated oil industry has led to the rise of not only non-violent political
activism, but also militant uprisings against the activities of multinationals and the Nigerian
state. Resistance movements have taken many forms since Nigeria’s transition from Abacha’s
brutal military rule to the civilian run Forth Republic. Under the Abacha regime the most noted
example of social oppression and injustice was seen by the unwarranted execution of the Ken
Saro-Wiwa and the other eight MOSOP members in 1995. Furthermore, as the resistant
movements of the late 1990s and 2000s became more aggressive and violent in nature, instances
of environmental destruction have increased accordingly. Since the formation of the terrorist
group MEND there have been hundreds of violent attacks against oil facilities and personnel.
These attacks have led to the tremendous loss of revenue for both Nigeria and the oil
multinationals operating in the area.
The unfortunate reality of the situation is that oil and gas operations in Nigeria continue
to be controlled by multinational companies and are sustained with the backing and support of
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the Nigerian state. Judicial scholar Paul Ocheje states “[a]s developments in Nigeria have
demonstrated law and the legal order can be manipulated in order to sustain the state and a
section of the society at the expense of the general public.”87 Nigeria as a whole could greatly
benefit from an investment and adherences to the laws its federal government enacts. “Nigeria
has the second highest level of flaring in the world, after Russia; and in most countries the excess
gas is collected and used to generate power. A World Bank report said the market value of gas
flared annually in Nigeria is between $500 million and $2.5 billion US dollars.”88
Efforts to remedy the situation are slow going, but pressure from the community is
helping the process gain momentum. Described in a recent article on gas flaring, as a result of
public outcry, Shell Company is investing money toward limiting the amount of gas flaring
operations in the Niger Delta from their oil wells. Shell stated this is an attempt to upgrade
equipment which will hopefully start a trend among the other oil companies in the area. This
article, like many similar ones highlighting altruistic intentions by multinationals, must be read
with a careful scrutiny.89 While Shell claims a reduction in flaring operations, Ben Amunwa
from the international human rights NGO platform stated that statistics from Shell’s current
Sustainability Report revealed a 32% increase in gas flaring from 2009 to 2010.90
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CONCLUSION

While historical scholarship has excellently detailed the Nigerian oil industry, there has
been no in-depth study of environmental degradation relating to the oil producing region of the
Niger Delta over the full range of time from the colonial era to post-independence period. The
economic and political policies instituted during British colonial rule led to a post-independence
Nigerian economy deeply dependent on the technological equipment and financial backing of
multinational oil companies. Once the British colonial administration established control and the
governing system of indirect rule was implemented, the British took systematic steps to gain
control of Nigeria’s raw materials. The conditions established during the late colonial period,
marked by Britain’s economic and technological superiority did little to enhance sustainable
technological development in Nigeria. As a result the multinational oil corporations have
dominated the entire spectrum of the Nigeria’s oil industry from oil exploration to oil production.
The Colonial Minerals Ordinance of 1914 as well as an inadequate educational system
helped to sustain the British monopolistic control of crude oil exploration in the Niger Delta
during the late colonial period. Because of this, Nigeria as an independent nation would
transition from colonial rule deficient in the technology and appropriate skill sets to effectively
exploit its oil resources. This left Nigeria dependent on foreign economies and multinational oil
companies which possessed the equipment and technological skill to extract and produce
Nigeria’s oil resources. While regulations were passed regarding resource control during the
colonial period, the British created no safeguards against environmental damage. This situation
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would get exponentially worse after 1956, when oil was discovered for the first time in
commercial quantities.
Nigerian politics went through incredible changes following independence in 1960. This
would first occur from 1965 to 1970, and then again from 1979 to 1986. During these two
periods Nigeria’s political landscape was beleaguered by ethnic politics, political corruption, and
the seizure of power by the military. The tensions in Nigerian politics would boil over in 1967 in
a civil war which left between one and three million Nigerians dead. Not only did the War leave
a significant political legacy by maintaining a military run government in the aftermath, but it
also had tremendous consequences for Nigeria’s oil industry, natural environment, and social
communities.
With the appeal of quick money, successive governments in Nigeria promoted the speedy
expansion of the oil industry in a regulatory vacuum. The Nigerian government, besides, lacked
the monitoring mechanisms to effectively oversee the oil industry with concerns relating to
environmental protection. Although legislative acts were passed during this time, they were not
properly implemented as a result of inherent contradictions, administrative inefficiency, and the
weakness of the Nigerian post-colonial state. With vague language, oil legislation more often
favored oil producers and foreign entities over the Nigerian people. In short, in the aftermath of
political independence, the multinational oil corporations operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta
were essentially left to monitor themselves.
It was not until 1988 that the Nigerian government enacted a law creating an
environmental regulatory agency with the specific goal of environmental protection. While
Nigeria’s Federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (FEPA) agenda was aimed at
environmental management, like many other governmental agencies in Nigeria, corruption and
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monetary gain trumped the effectiveness of its mission. The continued failure to implement
regulations guiding Nigeria’s oil industry has generated uprisings among the populations of the
most exploited areas. While the resistance movements of the 1990s and 2000s have gained some
attention by the global community, the collective message of environmental protection has been
continually silenced by the successive Nigerian governments both military and civilian. In 1995,
MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members were unjustly executed. In the wake of
the executions resistance movements across the Delta Region became more aggressive and
violent in nature and instances of environmental destruction increased accordingly. The late
1990s saw an increase in cases of sabotage on oil production facilities and pipelines by Nigerian
militant groups which caused damage to local ecological areas through oil spillage.
Compounding the problem was the illegal sale of crude oil, or “blood oil,” on the black market
with profits directly funding further militant activity. While some measures have been taken to
curb the continued destruction of the environment, progress has been slow. Undoubtedly,
decades of British rule created the conditions that ultimately rendered successive Nigerian
governments deeply dependent on foreign entities leaving the Niger Delta people to suffer the
consequences of environmental degradation from a reckless and unregulated oil industry.
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